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Screening Out Innovation:
The Merits of Meritless Litigation
ALEXANDER A. REINERT*
Courts and legislatures often conflate meritless and frivolous cases when
balancing the desire to keep courthouse doors open to novel or unlikely claims
against the concern that entertaining ultimately unsuccessful litigation will prove
too costly for courts and defendants. Recently, significant procedural and
substantive barriers to civil litigation have been informed by judicial and
legislative assumptions about the costs of entertaining meritless and frivolous
litigation. The prevailing wisdom is that eliminating meritless and frivolous claims
as early in a case’s trajectory as possible will focus scarce resources on the truly
meritorious cases, thereby ensuring that available remedies are properly
distributed to deserving plaintiffs.
Frivolous and meritless litigation are not the same, however. Frivolous claims
are easier to identify at the outset of litigation because they rest on unrecognizable
legal theories or fantastical factual allegations. More importantly, meritless
litigation has a distinct and identifiable value that is obscured by conflating
meritless claims with frivolous ones. Unlike frivolous litigation, meritless litigation
can bring to light facts that may lead to systematic reform (even where no legal
cause of action lies), lead to legal innovation by announcing new interpretations of
common law and statutory and constitutional texts, and pave the way for future
changes in the law. Recognizing the value of meritless litigation and distinguishing
meritless from frivolous cases therefore raises questions about the recent barriers
that have been imposed to civil litigation. Taking the value of meritless litigation
into account is essential if we are to strike the correct balance between the costs
and benefits of keeping courthouse doors open.
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INTRODUCTION
The language of legal innovation is often expressed in biological terms. Thus,
law is said to “evolve,” according to judges and commentators.1 Similarly, law
“adapts” or makes “adaptations” to new contexts and circumstances.2 There are
some doctrines, like the Eighth Amendment, that are judged specifically according
to “evolving standards.”3 These words have a biologic, if not progressive, tilt—in
the life sciences, evolution and adaptation are the words most commonly used to
describe the change in species over time.
But although the law has embraced this metaphor of biology, it has not
embraced a critical aspect of evolutionary theory: the value of failure. As Stephen
Jay Gould famously wrote, “[H]onorable errors do not count as failures in science,
but as seeds for progress in the quintessential activity of correction.”4 In biology, it
is understood that innovation is the product of many errors or mistakes. With their
view from a multimillennial perspective, paleontologists in particular might note
that life is principally a story of extinction: 99% or more of all species that ever

1. Indeed, the use of the term “evolve” with respect to law is so common as to be clichéd.
According to a search of the JLR database, the word “law” and “evolve” or “evolution” occur
within three words of each other in more than 10,000 articles. According to a search of the
“ALLFEDS” database, 783 federal opinions contain that language (including 33 Supreme Court
opinions). And 1072 state court opinions contain that formulation.
2. Like evolve or evolution, the word “law” appears quite often accompanied by
“adapt” or “adaptation.” There are 4169 journal articles, 148 federal court opinions
(including 24 Supreme Court decisions), and 467 state court opinions in which the word
“law” occurs within three words of “adapt” or “adaptation.”
3. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (introducing term
“evolving standards of decency”); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102–03 (1976)
(applying Trop in context of prisoner medical care); Alexander A. Reinert, Eighth
Amendment Gaps: Can Conditions of Confinement Litigation Benefit from Proportionality
Theory?, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 53, 64–66 (2009) (describing development of doctrine).
4. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, LEONARDO’S MOUNTAIN OF CLAMS AND THE DIET OF WORMS:
ESSAYS ON NATURAL HISTORY 163 (1998).
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roamed the earth are no longer extant.5 Traits that are maladaptive in one context
can become advantageous in another.6
In the law, however, value is generally measured by outcome. A case is
successful and therefore valuable if it alters the status quo with respect to the
relationship between plaintiff and defendant (e.g., payment of money or an
agreement to do or cease to do something).7 If it does not, it is easy to write off as a
failure and simply a burden to the legal system. My project in this Article is to
show that this assumption is costly and wrong. It imposes costs because
assumptions about the burden of what is called “meritless” litigation have led to the
adoption of legal rules that inhibit innovation by treating all unsuccessful litigation
as presumptively frivolous. It is wrong because even patently unsuccessful
litigation can contribute to positive legal change. Indeed, as in the context of
evolution, such litigation may be necessary to accomplish legal innovation.
Take our modern understanding of the constitutional limitations on sex
classifications, informed by a series of cases that began with Reed v. Reed and
culminated in Craig v. Boren.8 By the end of this series, one could make two
observations: first, intentional sex classifications would be judged under
“intermediate scrutiny”; and second, the State would have more leeway to make
classifications based on “real” and not stereotyped differences. But one would not
be able to understand this framework without both the meritorious and meritless
cases. As just one example, because of an unsuccessful constitutional challenge, we
know that a “real” difference between sexes that can justify a facial sex-based
classification is past discrimination against women in the workplace; because of a
successful challenge, we know that generalizations about the bonds formed by
mothers and fathers with their children cannot justify a facial classification.9 As
regards innovation in the law, both principles have value.

5. See Stephen Jay Gould, The Golden Rule: A Proper Scale for Our Environmental
Crisis, in EIGHT LITTLE PIGGIES 41, 46 (1993).
6. In other words, degrees of maladaptation are relative. Traits that are neutral in one
context can be adaptive or maladaptive in another. See generally Bernard J. Crespi, The
Evolution of Maladaptation, 84 HEREDITY 623 (2000).
7. Some will argue that even cases that result in the payment of money may be
frivolous or meritless. For reasons that I explain below, this Article rests on the assumption
that a case that results in a positive outcome for the plaintiff is meritorious. See infra notes
41–46 and accompanying text.
8. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down statute that provided
different drinking ages for men and women); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975) (striking down Social Security Act provision that differentiated based on sex of
wage-earning spouse); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (upholding preferences
for women in Navy’s promotion system); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)
(upholding classification based on pregnancy in California’s disability insurance program);
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (upholding state property tax exemption for widows
but not widowers); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (striking down provision of
military benefits statute that disfavored spouses of women service members); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971) (rejecting sex classification in estate proceedings); see also Califano v.
Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (sustaining preference for women in calculation of social
security benefits).
9. Compare Webster, 430 U.S. 313, with Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
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There will be an immediate rejoinder, informed by a legitimate concern about
resources. Our procedural regime relies on a number of filters that funnel an evernarrowing set of cases toward trial: pre-answer screening, pre-discovery motion
practice, and summary judgment are the most prominent examples. Meritless cases
that remain in the system impose burdens on both defendants and courts that we
must consider as we arrive at the proper standard for each filter.10 If one only
focuses on the burdens of adjudicating weak or meritless cases, however, it is easy
to lose sight of the reality that even ultimately unsuccessful cases can offer benefits
to the legal system. Arriving at the right standard for each procedural filter requires
accounting for both the burdens and potential benefits of litigation with varying
merit. Academics, judges, and legislators have single-mindedly concentrated only
on burdens.11 This Article shifts the focus to more completely address the benefits
of meritless litigation.
The need for intervention is most critical when policing the often-ignored line
between frivolous and meritless litigation. Frivolous litigation is one of the few
problems that invites universal scorn by legislators, judges, and academics.12 But
this superficial agreement obscures an important question: Just what is “frivolous”
litigation? And, relatedly, how is frivolous litigation different from meritless
litigation? The failure to precisely answer this latter question makes it too easy to
conflate the categories and therefore too easy to see both kinds of cases as equally
valueless. After all, if one contemplates only the burdens of unsuccessful litigation,
there is little if any difference between frivolous and meritless claims. As I argue in
this Article, however, meritless litigation, doomed as it may be, has much more to
offer the legal system.
Legislators, judges, and academics have paid varying attention to the question of
what constitutes a frivolous case and how it might be distinguished from a meritless
one. Congress has tended to treat meritless and frivolous cases as substantially
overlapping categories of the same subset. The Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), for example, targets both meritless and frivolous litigation as equally
problematic.13 Similarly, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)
treats abusive, frivolous, and meritless lawsuits together as equally damaging to the
public, the courts, investors, and issuers of securities.14 Many states have
introduced legislation targeting meritless and frivolous litigation as well.15 Thus,

10. See Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two
Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 1217, 1218 (2008).
11. For examples from academic writing, see generally infra notes 22–25. For examples
from judicial opinions, see infra Parts II.A.1 and II.A.3. The Prison Litigation Reform Act
and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act are prime examples of the legislative focus
on the burdens of meritless litigation. See infra Parts II.B.1 & II.B.2.
12. As Suja Thomas writes, “It seems that everyone is against frivolous cases. How can
you not be?” Suja A. Thomas, Frivolous Cases, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 633, 634 (2010).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2006); infra notes 138–65 and accompanying text.
14. The PSLRA introduced a heightened pleading requirement for securities litigation,
among many other barriers to success. See infra Part II.B.2.
15. States have adopted their own versions of the PLRA, for example. See infra
Part II.B.1. And states have attempted to stem the tide of frivolous litigation by extending
some of the PLRA’s limitations to all “vexatious” litigants. See generally Erin Schiller &
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for state and federal legislators, purging the judicial docket of both meritless and
frivolous cases often is seen to advance the same goals. And most of this legislation
does not contemplate the possibility that meritless cases make positive
contributions to the law.16
Similarly, judges tend to regard both frivolous and meritless cases as drags on
the legal system, offering no offsetting benefits. Qualified immunity doctrine in
civil rights cases has been modified to make it more difficult overall to obtain
damages remedies against government officials, on the logic that it is necessary to
deter frivolous or insubstantial cases.17 The Supreme Court has gradually reduced
the availability of damages remedies against federal officials because of the
perception that such litigation is primarily frivolous.18 More broadly, the Supreme
Court recently adopted substantial changes to federal pleading doctrine to reduce
the risk that litigants with frivolous and meritless claims will take advantage of the
high cost of discovery to extract nuisance settlements from innocent defendants.19
Similar changes have been embraced at the summary judgment stage.20 Although
all of these changes impact meritless cases overall, and not just frivolous ones,
courts generally justify them as necessary to deter the filing of frivolous cases.21
And like legislators, courts rarely acknowledge any benefit from adjudicating
meritless cases (even when such cases are resolved at an early procedural stage).
Legal scholars have recognized that the term “frivolous” is ill-defined and that
there are costs to failing to differentiate the frivolous from the nonfrivolous.22 But
even so, most commentators have failed to adequately distinguish between
frivolous and meritless cases.23 This is particularly vexing in discussions of
Jeffrey A. Wertkin, Note, Frivolous Filings and Vexatious Litigation, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 909 (2001) (discussing litigation introduced in California, Texas, and Hawaii).
16. As I discuss below, Congress could, and occasionally has, recognized the value of
meritless cases. See, e.g., infra notes 254, 256–58 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Part II.A.2.
18. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs
Without Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23 (arguing that Bivens
remedy has been gradually undermined and is currently endangered).
19. See infra Part II.A.1.
20. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 520
(1997) (“We have no . . . common agreement on what constitutes a ‘frivolous suit.”’); Sanford
Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All?, 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
353, 378 (1987) (stating that it is difficult to distinguish between “weak” and “frivolous”
cases); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 81–82 (2010) (decrying lack of common definition of
“frivolous” litigation); Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform:
Miscasting the Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 449–50 (2004) (giving
examples of public, judicial, and jury disagreement over what is frivolous); Thomas, supra note
12, at 634.
23. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on
the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 371, 373 (1996) (equating frivolous with non-meritorious); Geoffrey Miller, A
Modest Proposal for Securities Fraud Pleading After Tellabs, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no.
1, 2012, at 93, 98; Rhode, supra note 22, at 449–50 (same); Thomas, supra note 12, at 634–35
(recognizing vagueness of term but failing to distinguish frivolous from meritless).
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procedural tools for filtering between frivolous, meritless, and meritorious cases.24
As just one concrete example, in the context of qui tam litigation, commentators
and courts alike often conflate the problem of frivolous litigation with meritless
litigation.25 Thus, many commentators appear to assume that False Claims Act
cases in which the Attorney General moves to dismiss or fails to intervene are both
frivolous and meritless.26 Even critics of judicial innovations such as heightened
pleading divide cases into two camps—the frivolous or meritless strike suit and the
meritorious claim.27

24. See Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading
Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 976–89 (1990)
(describing various rules that filter out frivolous and meritless cases, without distinguishing
between the two); Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 870 & n.106 (2010) (equating “truly meritless”
with “frivolous”); Joseph A. Seiner, After Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 179, 226 & n.354
(2010) (conflating meritless and frivolous); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49
B.C. L. REV. 431, 432, 486 (2008) (describing rules that ensure the dismissal of meritless and
frivolous claims, without distinguishing between the two). But see Matthew Diller, Judicial
Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 20–21
(2000) (making distinction between frivolous ADA claims and claims dismissed because of
particular interpretation of the statute).
25. See John T. Boese & Beth C. McClain, Why Thompson Is Wrong: Misuse of the False
Claims Act to Enforce the Anti-kickback Act, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1, 49 (1999) (arguing that
frivolous suits are insufficiently filtered by the False Claims Act because the Department of
Justice must “affirmatively move for the dismissal of meritless suits, a process that requires a
modest commitment of prosecutorial resources”); Joan H. Krause, Regulating, Guiding, and
Enforcing Health Care Fraud, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 241, 281 (2004) (“[A] successful
system must generate primarily meritorious suits, and weed out frivolous ones. To achieve this
goal, the incentives must be generous enough to induce participation by insiders, yet not so
tempting as to engender meritless suits.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)); Christopher
W. Myers, The False Claims Act Clarification Act: An End to the FCA’s Bar on Parasitic Qui
Tam Actions?, PROCUREMENT LAW., Spring 2009, at 7, 10 (“The infrequency of government
dismissals under section 3730(c)(2)(A) is not for lack of frivolous FCA suits. Indeed, statistics
published by the DOJ suggest that a large percentage of FCA suits are meritless, especially
those in which the government declines intervention.”); Christina Orsini Broderick, Note, Qui
Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949,
995 (2007) (“[T]here appears to be a significant number of frivolous qui tam actions. . . . [T]he
fact that the Attorney General has only intervened in just over 10% of the qui tam actions filed
with the office since 1999 shows that it is likely to be large.”); see also United States ex rel.
Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 559 (8th Cir. 2006).
26. See, e.g., Boese & McClain, supra note 25, at 49; Myers, supra note 25, at 10. The
decision not to intervene, however, does not necessarily reflect the Department of Justice’s
view that the case is frivolous. See Michael Rich, Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Encouraging the
Department of Justice to Rein In Out-of-Control Qui Tam Litigation Under the Civil False
Claims Act, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1261, 1263–64 (2008) (discussing intervention decision
and its relationship to prospect of recovery and noting that relators sometimes prevail even in
cases in which there is no intervention).
27. See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987,
1059–60 (2003) (criticizing substance-specific heightened pleading standards on the grounds
that they are based on anecdotes and that they may lead to the “improper dismissal of
potentially meritorious cases”).
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The exception to this general trend is in discussions of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11, which is the most recognizable tool for addressing frivolous but not
meritless claims. In this context, Robert Bone has been a leading voice, defining a
frivolous claim as one in which “a plaintiff files suit knowing facts that decisively
establish little or no chance of the defendant’s objective liability on the basis of any
of the legal theories plaintiff alleges” or “without conducting a reasonable prefiling
investigation when such an investigation would have revealed facts establishing
little or no chance that the defendant was actually liable on any of the legal theories
alleged.”28 This is a useful starting point, but Bone’s definition is meant to help
decide when a lawyer or party should be sanctioned for litigation behavior, not to
resolve how a case should be adjudicated. Relatedly, Bone and most other
commentators on Rule 11 standards have not sought to elaborate the value of
adjudicating meritless cases.29 This Article articulates the values of meritless
litigation and also frames the problem in the broader context of case disposition,
not the Rule 11 context of sanctions.
In Part I, I explain why, for the purpose of this Article, it is useful to have a
modified version of Bone’s definition of a frivolous case. Because the focus of this
Article is case disposition, not independent sanctions, I propose that our
understanding of “frivolous” should revolve around timing and substance. By
timing, I mean that judges should have a conception of frivolous that permits
application at the moment of filing. By substance, I mean that our definition should
exclude only those cases that, by their substantive claims or allegations, can safely
be said to have a zero chance of success. If we cannot determine at filing that a case
has a zero chance of success, then the case may be meritless or meritorious, and
permitting the case to proceed through subsequent procedural steps (answer,
motion practice, and possibly discovery followed by summary judgment) has the
potential to add value to the legal system. In Part II, I turn to demonstrating the
many ways in which legislatures and courts fail to narrowly define “frivolous,” and
in so doing merge frivolous with meritless. My goal is to demonstrate, even to
those readers who would adopt a different definition of “frivolous,” that legislators
and judges have failed to clearly articulate the distinction between meritless and
frivolous cases.
In Part III, I explain the many ways in which nonmeritorious, but nonfrivolous
cases can contribute to the law and how the dynamics explored in Part II undermine
these contributions. Some meritless cases contribute by revealing facts that
otherwise would remain private: facts that expose wrongdoing that is not
remediable under law, facts that lead to other legal actors instituting action, and
facts that lead to legal reform. Some meritless cases contribute by clarifying
existing law or by announcing new legal principles. Some of these benefits have
been recognized, at least implicitly, before. John Jeffries, for instance, has pointed
out that qualified immunity doctrine gives courts leeway to announce new legal
principles without holding government officials retroactively accountable.30 But

28. Bone, supra note 22, at 531–32 (emphasis omitted).
29. Also writing in the context of Rule 11, Charles Yablon has offered a defense of at
least some meritless cases. See Charles M. Yablon, The Good, the Bad, and the Frivolous
Case: An Essay on Probability and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L. REV. 65, 94, 104–06 (1996).
30. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE
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Jeffries has done so to defend the gap that qualified immunity creates between
rights and remedies, not to defend the value of meritless litigation.31 And other
scholars who have accepted the prospect that meritless cases could provide value
that frivolous cases do not have limited their comments to the Rule 11 context and
its potential deterrence of novel legal arguments.32 My concern here is the extent to
which the value of meritless cases is underappreciated throughout civil litigation, as
reflected in the legislative and judicial trends I identify in Part II.
I briefly conclude with a discussion about what it might mean to better account
for the distinction between meritless and frivolous litigation. In some limited
circumstances, it should result in a wholesale revision of how we treat certain
categories of cases, such as prisoners’ rights litigation. More broadly, however, it
should enable us to strike the correct balance between keeping our courthouse
doors open to potentially transformative legal claims on one hand and minimizing
the costs of entertaining losing cases on the other. Achieving the proper balance
will always require recalibration over time, but we cannot hope to be on the best
path without acknowledging the potential benefits of meritless litigation.
I. DISTINGUISHING THE FRIVOLOUS CASE
To appreciate the value of meritless (as opposed to frivolous) claims, it is
necessary first to have a working conception of both terms that will serve a useful
purpose when adjudicating cases (rather than, as in the Rule 11 context, when
assessing sanctions). A definition of frivolous and meritless that accounts for the
value of entertaining such claims necessarily involves a consideration of the costs
of adjudication as well. If some litigation provides no value to the legal system,
then any judicial time spent adjudicating such claims is wasted.33 Thus, timing is a
key component of conceptions of frivolousness and meritlessness. Of course, a
claim’s substance also is particularly important. Some claims will be frivolous for
obvious reasons—for example, the plaintiff who asks that the government construct
a Statue-of-Liberty-sized statue in his likeness on Governor’s Island, valued at
$100 billion, as a remedy for not receiving an unconditional pardon from the
President of the United States.34 Others will be frivolous because they are based on
a conception of the law that is both unsupported and unsupportable under any
existing principle.35 And some claims will be frivolous because they are based on
allegations of outlandish facts that are the stuff of science fiction.36 These examples
L.J. 87, 88–90 (1999).
31. See id.
32. See D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some
“Striking” Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 57
(1976); Yablon, supra note 29, at 105.
33. See Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of
Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39, 41 (2008)
(“[E]arly dismissals, by eliminating low-merit claims before they become costly, offer
benefits to society in comparison to late dismissals.”).
34. See Complaint, Hall v. Clinton, No. 1:01-cv-06218 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
35. See, e.g., Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 794 (7th Cir. 2011) (listing “obviously
frivolous claims” such as “something called a ‘direct action under [the] U.S. Constitution’”
(alteration in original)).
36. See, e.g., Qamar v. CIA, 489 F. App’x 393, 395 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding
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should make clear that most claims can be assessed for frivolousness upon the
filing of a complaint. As I will explain below, however, it will usually be difficult
to say that a nonfrivolous claim is meritless at the outset of litigation; assessing the
merit of nonfrivolous claims will often require adversarial briefing or factual
discovery.
A precise definition of both terms is not essential, because what is most
important is to understand that frivolous cases may be different than meritless ones
and that how we define the term “frivolous” reflects a value judgment about
meritless cases. Thus, if we believe that all meritless cases are frivolous, and vice
versa, then conflating the two kinds of cases in terms of their value to the legal
system is unproblematic. As a formal matter, however, both courts and
commentators resist this kind of definition. In Neitzke v. Williams,37 the Supreme
Court rejected the contention that all complaints that failed to state a claim were
frivolous, holding instead that a frivolous claim for the purposes of case disposition
“lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”38 Even though there was
“considerable” overlap between the failure-to-state-a-claim standard and the
frivolousness standard, “it does not follow that a complaint which falls afoul of the
former standard will invariably fall afoul of the latter.”39 And most commentators,
even though they may believe that meritless and frivolous claims are equally
valueless, tend to recognize that they should be defined differently at least for the
purpose of Rule 11 sanctions.40
This suggests that we should have a broad taxonomy of frivolous, meritless, and
meritorious cases, even as we recognize that there may be overlap between how we
conceptualize the first and second categories. To start, it is useful to begin with an
even broader division, between successful and unsuccessful cases, in which success
is defined as the plaintiff’s recovery of something of value through litigation.41
I assume here that “successful” cases should be neither frivolous nor meritless.
This is a proposition that will provoke argument, for there are some who maintain
that this assumption is false: namely that settlements are obtained for claims that
are clearly frivolous or at least meritless and that juries may award substantial
damages for claims that lack merit. For instance, many argue that the costs of
discovery and the concomitant pressure on defendants to settle otherwise meritless
suits are rampant problems.42 The expense of electronic discovery only amplifies
“incredible” allegations that plaintiff was sexually assaulted by prison officials so that they
could plant drugs which would then form the basis of enhanced interrogation by the CIA);
Cofield v. Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 936 F.2d 512, 515–16 (11th Cir. 1991) (describing
“fantastic” allegation of conspiracy by prison officials).
37. 490 U.S. 319 (1989).
38. Id. at 325.
39. Id. at 326.
40. See sources cited supra notes 22, 27–29.
41. This is the standard used by most empiricists to study success in litigation outcomes.
See, e.g., Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its
Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 833 (2010); Margo
Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1592–93 (2003); Stewart J. Schwab &
Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney
Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 726–27 (1988).
42. See Alistair Dawson, House Bill 4 and the Future of Class Action Litigation,
ADVOCATE (Tex.), Fall 2003, at 60, 63 (noting that “regardless of the merits,” in class action
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this narrative.43 Others maintain that the high cost of discovery is a double-edged
sword and can force a plaintiff with little resources to settle claims for less value
than they are worth.44 And of course there are those who question the assertion that
discovery abuse is pervasive and leads to an inordinate number of extortionate
settlements.45 Indeed, much of the empirical literature suggests that discovery
unfolds rationally, with higher costs spent on more complex cases, while most
cases generate little in the way of discovery costs.46

cases, oftentimes defendants would prefer to settle than to bear the high cost of discovery);
Cameron S. Matheson, Transvestite Cowboys, Thieving Brokers, and the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act: SLUSA’s Trap for the Unwary Plaintiff, 35 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 121, 126 (2004) (noting that Congress believed that the high costs associated with
discovery may allow a party with a frivolous suit to force the defendant to settle securities
class actions); Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073,
2093–98 (2002) (reviewing and then debunking claim that litigants use discovery tools to
harass opponents with burdensome requests); see also Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 268 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[D]iscovery and discoveryrelated judicial proceedings take time, they are expensive, and cost and delay, or threats of
cost and delay, can themselves force parties to settle underlying disputes.”); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975) (stating that expanding category of
plaintiffs who could sue in securities litigation would encourage use of discovery for in
terrorem increase of settlement value); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298
(7th Cir. 1995) (citing Judge Friendly’s use of term “blackmail” for those settlements in
which defendants settle weak class action claims because of risks at trial).
43. See Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better:
The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 894
(2009) (“[E]-discovery can cost tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars in even fairly
typical cases . . . .”); Jessica Lynn Repa, Comment, Adjudicating Beyond the Scope of
Ordinary Business: Why the Inaccessibility Test in Zubulake Unduly Stifles Cost-Shifting
During Electronic Discovery, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 257, 295–96 (2004) (noting that high
discovery costs create incentives to settle, even for meritorious suits).
44. See Mathias Reimann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the
Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 751, 817
n.351 (2003) (discussing why the high costs of discovery can work against a plaintiff);
Meade W. Mitchell, Comment, Discovery Abuse and a Proposed Reform: Mandatory
Disclosure, 62 MISS. L.J. 743, 744–55 (1993) (tying discovery abuse to the adversarial
system, not to abuses solely by plaintiffs’ counsel); id. at 751 n.41 (“Each side is motivated
to hide information, especially information or witnesses exposure of which could cause
severe adverse consequences to the client.”). Docket congestion may also play a role in a
plaintiff’s decision to settle. George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion
Problem, 69 B.U. L. REV. 527, 543 (1989) (presenting theoretical and empirical reasons to
believe that settlement decisions are influenced by docket delay).
45. See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access,
94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 922–23 (2009) (arguing that cause of meritless filings leading to
unjustified settlements is not discovery costs, but asymmetric information); Silver, supra
note 42, at 2093 (reviewing empirical data that undermine given wisdom that discovery costs
force defendants to settle meritless suits).
46. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in
Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 769–76 (2010) (reporting data that show that
discovery costs are not high and that the most important variable contributing to discovery
costs is the amount at stake in the litigation); Silver, supra note 42, at 2096–97.
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Whatever the strength of these arguments in specific cases, there are no
compelling data to suggest that there is a widespread problem of plaintiffs
prevailing in meritless cases more often than defendants prevailing when they
should not. And as for the role of settlement, precisely because the facts that
undergird such cases are undeveloped and unadjudicated, claims about the extent to
which defendants routinely settle frivolous or meritless cases are claims that at this
point lack substantiation. Thus, I will limit my discussion of frivolous and meritless
cases to those instances in which claimants are unsuccessful in obtaining anything
of value through litigation, whether by trial or settlement.
The next related question is whether all unsuccessful cases are also meritless
(and, in some cases, frivolous). To answer it, one must break down the category of
unsuccessful cases even further. In some cases, a plaintiff will be victorious at trial
but have the outcome overturned on appeal. These cases, while ultimately
unsuccessful, should not be considered meritless. Indeed, it is difficult to
characterize any case that proceeds to trial, at least after a summary judgment
adjudication, as meritless.47 If a reasonable jury could find in favor of the plaintiff,
the case is not rendered meritless by the fact that the specific jury called to
adjudicate a plaintiff’s case found for the defendant. After all, in most civil cases in
which the burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, a plaintiff who loses
at trial may have failed to convince the fact-finder by a very slim margin.48 If,
however, a reasonable jury could not find in favor of the plaintiff, either for legal or
factual reasons, her case should be considered meritless. Similarly, if a complaint
does not state a claim for relief, for either legal or factual reasons, it should be
considered meritless. And, clearly, if a complaint fails to meet pre-answer
screening thresholds imposed by some specific statutes,49 it also should be
considered meritless.
There are some claims that do not easily fit into this universe. For instance,
claims that are dismissed as a sanction for litigation-related conduct or as a
consequence of the failure to prosecute are unsuccessful but have not had a merits
adjudication.50 And claims that are ultimately unsuccessful because of an
intervening change in law may not fairly be called meritless, at least at their
inception.51 But these exceptions do not undermine the basic point that meritless
and unsuccessful litigation are distinct.

47. An exception might be if an appellate court determines that the case never should
have been sent to the jury.
48. Empirical data regarding jury deliberations is difficult to come by, but some studies
suggest that where jurors disagree about liability, they may mediate their disagreement by
coming to a compromise on damages awards. See Meiring de Villiers, A Legal and Policy
Analysis of Bifurcated Litigation, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 153, 177–82. This does not mean
that the juries compromise in meritless cases, but only that a verdict may not reflect unanimity.
49. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915–1915A (2006).
50. For the purpose of preclusion doctrine, such claims will be considered to have been
resolved “on the merits.” But preclusion doctrine is not the subject of this Article.
51. For instance, a prisoner in the Second Circuit who failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies prior to filing a complaint regarding the use of excessive force would have had a
viable claim at the inception of the lawsuit, but not after 2002 when the Supreme Court rejected
the Second Circuit’s exception for exhaustion of excessive force claims. Hernadez v. Coffey,
No. 99 Civ. 11615(WHP), 2003 WL 22241431, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2003) (applying the
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If we were to sketch out the landscape I have described so far, it would look like
this: all successful cases are meritorious, most unsuccessful cases are meritless,52
but some meritorious cases are unsuccessful. It remains to be determined where to
place frivolous litigation. As I have suggested earlier, in an ideal procedural system
frivolous claims are not successful. Nor should frivolous claims proceed to trial.
And they typically should be resolved before summary judgment and discovery.
The hardest line to draw, however, may be between frivolous claims and those that
do not meet a pre-discovery threshold.53 In both federal and state systems, this
typically involves some assessment of the complaint and whether it states a claim
for relief.54 Many, if not all, frivolous complaints will not state a claim for relief,
but a complaint that fails to state a claim is not by definition frivolous.
What, then, distinguishes a frivolous claim from a meritless one? As noted in the
introduction, Robert Bone defines a frivolous action as one in which “a plaintiff
files suit knowing facts that decisively establish little or no chance of the
defendant’s objective liability on the basis of any of the legal theories plaintiff
alleges” or “without conducting a reasonable prefiling investigation when such an
investigation would have revealed facts establishing little or no chance that the
defendant was actually liable on any of the legal theories alleged.”55 Bone’s
definition, however, is focused on identifying frivolous litigation so as to regulate it
and therefore hopefully deter its filing.56 Thus, Bone understandably gives great
weight to the litigant or attorney’s state of mind. For the purposes of this Article,
however, it is more useful to look to a definition that focuses on a court’s ability to
distinguish frivolous cases for the purposes of case disposition.
For the Supreme Court, a frivolous claim is one that lacks an arguable basis in
fact or law.57 That is, a frivolous claim is one that relies on factual allegations or
legal theories so outlandish as to be inarguably insufficient. By incorporating
concerns of timing, I propose a conception that incorporates some of Bone’s and
some of the Court’s: for the purpose of case disposition, a frivolous suit is one in
which a judge determines that the plaintiff has no arguable basis to believe that she
may establish the defendant’s liability on the basis of any of the legal theories she
alleges. This modification is significant on several different levels. First, it focuses
on what a judge may determine at any procedural stage. Most frivolous litigation is
disposed of upon the filing of a complaint, when a judge may promptly determine
rule of Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002), to lawsuit filed in 1999).
52. This contention is based on the fact that most cases are resolved prior to trial. See
Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004) (“The portion of
federal civil cases resolved by trial fell from 11.5 percent in 1962 to 1.8 percent in 2002.”);
see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 119, 142–43 (2002) (citing statistics of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts showing decline in number of jury trials). Thus, most unsuccessful cases will not be
resolved at trial; they will be resolved at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage.
These cases will fall into the conception of meritless proposed here.
53. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (recognizing “overlap” between
frivolous standard and failure-to-state-claim standard).
54. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(a)(7) (McKinney 2006).
55. Bone, supra note 22, at 531–32 (emphasis omitted).
56. See id. at 586–96.
57. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325.
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the basis for the plaintiff’s claims. But some litigation may not be revealed as
frivolous until later in the litigation, after discovery shows that the plaintiff has no
reasonable basis to continue to pursue her claims.58 Thus, in some ways, my
conception is narrower than Bone’s (by focusing on what a judge may determine,
not on what the plaintiff knows). And in some ways it is broader, by admitting the
possibility that a case may become frivolous post-filing as a result of information
disclosed by the parties. The “arguable basis” for the plaintiff’s belief is meant to
be a combination of Bone’s focus on either the plaintiff’s knowledge or the
plaintiff’s pre-filing investigation. But the limitation of frivolous to only those
cases in which a plaintiff cannot succeed (as opposed to having “little or no
chance” of success) is meant also to narrow the scope of frivolous cases.59
If that conception of frivolous litigation serves the purposes of this Article, it is
fair to ask what I mean by meritless litigation. A meritless claim, by contrast to a
frivolous one, is a claim in which a court determines, after adversarial briefing or
discovery, that a plaintiff’s theory of relief is insufficient or that a reasonable jury
could not find facts that would allow a plaintiff to recover. Again, this conception
involves considerations of both timing and substance. At the outset of litigation, it
will be difficult for a court to judge the merits of a case. It may require argument
from the parties to clarify the state of the law, or discovery to clarify factual
disputes.
The conception of frivolous litigation I put on the table is not without its
drawbacks. First, it is important to recognize that it does not account for a
defendant’s perceptions or goals. I focus on judicial perceptions of merit because
deterring and regulating frivolous cases are primarily questions of judicial
administration. It is the judiciary that is peculiarly harmed by frivolous litigation,
because such litigation imposes costs without any coordinate benefit. By contrast,
meritless litigation imposes costs but has the potential to add benefit to the legal
system overall (more on that below). Defendants, on the other hand, are harmed
equally by both meritless and frivolous litigation. They do not receive any benefit
from either one and have to pay equally to defend them. From a defendant’s
perspective, any meritless litigation that moves forward, whether frivolous or not,
imposes a cost and provides no value.

58. Notably, there would certainly be an argument that sanctions should issue to a
litigant or lawyer who continues to prosecute a claim where discovery has revealed that there
is a zero chance of success. The only point I am making here is that the case may be
frivolous as a matter of adjudication as well.
59. Cf. Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 121
(2009) (defining the “paradigmatically” frivolous suit as one in which both the plaintiff and
the defendant determine that there is zero risk that the defendant will be held liable). This
conception to some extent assumes that there is a valid way to stochastically evaluate merit.
Identifying cases with a zero percent chance of success may seem possible in the abstract,
but reliably doing so may prove impossible in practice. In this sense, it might be more
accurate to think of cases as having varying degrees of merit. On this account, merit
becomes easier to objectively assess as one obtains more information, but ultimately one can
only hope to account for a fact-bound assessment that cannot be reduced to probabilities.
While this view is compelling in many respects, it is not the view that has been adopted by
courts or legislators, as I will discuss below. Thus, it is not as useful to this Article’s project.
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Second, I began this Part with a discussion of merit that mixes both ex ante and
ex post considerations. That is, I have relied on an ex post event (success) to define
merit in part, but have proposed a standard that must be applied ex ante. This is not
a problem that is unique to my conception of frivolous; any standard that is used to
distinguish frivolous, meritless, and meritorious cases prior to submitting the claim
to a finder of fact will suffer from the same difficulty. And to the extent that using
ex ante assessments to evaluate merit is problematic, it is worth noting that courts
and legislators, in imposing the rules I describe below, appear to be operating from
the same rationale. Their goal has been to tighten the standards ex ante so as to
reduce, ex post, the number of unsuccessful suits. Thus, for the purpose of this
Article’s intervention, the difficulty of using an ex ante standard to make an ex post
prediction is not troubling.
II. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE FAILURE TO DISTINGUISH
BETWEEN FRIVOLOUS AND MERITLESS LITIGATION
Having put a conception of frivolous and meritless litigation on the table that
distinguishes between the two categories, I will now turn to the world of legislators
and judges, in which all nonmeritorious litigation is often treated as similarly
burdensome and valueless. Thus, even if one had quibbles with the position I
staked out in the previous Part, I will show in this Part how recent legislative and
judicial changes have been premised on the conflation of meritless and frivolous
litigation. Be it in subject-specific areas, such as civil rights or securities litigation,
or in transsubstantive rules of pleading and summary disposition, judges and
legislators enact rules that assume that meritless and frivolous litigation are nearly
identical species of the same nonmeritorious genus.
A. Transsubstantive Conflation
For the most part, the judiciary is the source of most transsubstantive conflation
of the benefits and burdens of meritless and frivolous litigation. Perceptions about
frivolousness have influenced both courts and lawmakers to reduce affirmative
incentives to sue, a reaction that cuts across lines of frivolous, meritless, and
meritorious claims.60 The Supreme Court, for instance, has limited recovery of
attorneys’ fees in civil rights cases, in part because of the assumption that the
prospect of fee awards was generating frivolous litigation.61 State courts have done
the same.62 To some extent all of these restrictions can be seen as a function of

60. See Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 826–28
(2011) (discussing judicial tools to respond to perception of frivolous litigation).
61. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 618 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (comparing payment of attorneys’ fees to
extortion); Annabelle Chan, Comment, The Buckhannon Stops Here: Buckhannon Board &
Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources Should Not
Apply to the New York Equal Access to Justice Act, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1358 (2004).
62. See Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 2027, 2038 (2008) (describing trends in state and federal courts toward limiting fees);
Andrea Saltzman, Incorporating Statutes into the Common Law: The Judicial Response to
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judicial management of heavy caseloads.63 But the judicial and public perception of
the strength of particular kinds of cases also inevitably plays a role.64 In this
Subpart, I begin with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s recent transition in
pleading doctrine, and then move to judicial innovation in the area of qualified
immunity, before closing with legislatively imposed barriers to litigation by
plaintiffs in poverty.
1. Pleading Doctrine’s Response to Frivolous and Meritless Cases
In all civil cases, the rules that govern pleading guide courts in conducting an
initial assessment of merit. Although pre-answer screening for frivolousness is
mandated for claims brought by certain categories of plaintiffs—discussed in more
detail in other parts of this paper—even those procedures are informed by rules of
pleading. Thus, whether through pre-answer screening or resolution of motions to
dismiss, a court typically has its first opportunity to evaluate merit by reviewing the
pleadings.
As any casual reader of federal cases can attest, pleading jurisprudence has been
indelibly marked by two recent Supreme Court decisions—Ashcroft v. Iqbal65 and
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.66 Although the extent of change wrought by these
two decisions is subject to some debate,67 the notoriety of the cases is not.68
Statutes Shifting Attorneys’ Fees, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1103, 1142 (1986) (describing state
court hostility in Illinois to fee-shifting); see also John Leubsdorf, Towards a History of the
American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 1984, at 9, 23
(describing judicial resistance to including legal expenses as a component of damages).
63. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19
STAN. L. REV. 786, 800 (1967) (noting that judges may react to caseload pressures with the
“adoption of ‘hostile’ substantive rules” effectively discouraging “litigants from using the
courts”).
64. See Lemos, supra note 60, at 837 (“The risk of judicial backlash, then, depends to a
large degree on judges’ views about the claims that Congress is seeking to encourage.”);
Laura Beth Nielsen & Aaron Beim, Media Misrepresentation: Title VII, Print Media, and
Public Perceptions of Discrimination Litigation, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 243 (2004)
(“In the aggregate, the media represents plaintiff victories in tort cases far more frequently
than they actually occur and jury awards as far greater than they actually are.”).
65. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
66. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
67. Compare, e.g., Bone, supra note 45, at 875 (“Many judges and academic
commentators read the decision as overturning fifty years of generous notice pleading
practice . . . .”), Alexander A. Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2012, at 1 (arguing that Iqbal and Twombly represent a shift in the
goals of pleading doctrine), and Spencer, supra note 24, at 432 (arguing that Twombly
“represents a break from the Court’s previous embrace of notice pleading”), with Adam N.
Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (2010) (arguing that Iqbal
and Twombly are not a sea change in pleading).
68. As of this writing, Twombly has been cited in over 65,000 published cases and over
1100 law review articles; Iqbal has been cited in over 43,000 cases and over 750 law review
articles. Both Iqbal and Twombly have been cited more than twice as often as several other
important cases that have dominated the legal landscape for decades, including Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), the seminal pleading case for five decades before Twombly and
Iqbal, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the defining case for choice of
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Understanding the significance of Iqbal and Twombly to the subject of this Article
requires some recourse to history.
The notice pleading standard was one of the most significant innovations of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938.69 As many commentators have
observed, the Rules eradicated the technicalities of claim-specific pleading that had
dominated legal practice for decades in favor of reliance on discovery and trial to
determine merit.70 Rule 8, requiring only a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”71 was a key intervention.72 Fact
pleading, which the Federal Rules were meant to displace, too often “led to
wasteful disputes about distinctions that [the drafters] thought were arbitrary or
metaphysical, too often cutting off adjudication on the merits.”73 As originally
conceived, Rule 12(b)(6) motions would test the sufficiency of complaints not by
reference to the facts alleged in the complaint, but by reference to whether there
was a legal claim that could be supported by the facts alleged.74
The Supreme Court’s decision in Conley v. Gibson75 was the seminal pleading
case for the five decades prior to Iqbal and Twombly. In Conley, the Court saw
pleading as a way of “facilitat[ing] a proper decision on the merits”76 by giving a
defendant “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.”77 Thus, according to Conley, a complaint satisfied Rule 8 without “set[ting]
out in detail the facts upon which [the claimant] bases his claim.”78 To the extent
that a defendant sought additional facts, the Conley Court was satisfied that Rule
law in diversity jurisdiction cases, and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), easily the most important administrative law case in the
past fifty years.
69. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
70. See Fairman, supra note 27, at 990–91; see also Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of
Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 438–40
(1986); Emily Sherwin, The Jurisprudence of Pleading: Rights, Rules, and Conley v.
Gibson, 52 HOW. L.J. 73, 76–77 (2008) (summarizing history of pleading standards and
functions from medieval origins onward). For an overall history of the Federal Rules, see
generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
71. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
72. The goal of the Federal Rules was to create both simplicity and uniformity in
pleading and to prevent premature dismissals. See Marcus, supra note 70, at 439 (“Rule
8(a)(2) was drafted carefully to avoid use of the charged phrases ‘fact,’ ‘conclusion,’ and
‘cause of action.’”).
73. See Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck & Stephen B. Burbank, Debate, Plausible
Denial: Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA
141, 148 (2009), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/158-U-Pa-L-Rev-PENNumbra-141.pdf
(Burbank, Rebuttal).
74. As such, Rule 12(b)(6) motions were meant to address the rare circumstance in
which a plaintiff’s claim for relief could be supported by no valid legal theory. See, e.g.,
Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic
Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 407 (2011).
75. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
76. Id. at 48.
77. Id. at 47.
78. Id.
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12(e), among other devices, would suffice.79 As for the role of Rule 12(b)(6)
motions, true to the original understanding of the drafters of the Federal Rules, the
Conley Court referred to “the accepted rule that a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief.”80
Rule 8’s notice pleading standard dominated the resolution of pre-discovery
motions, at least rhetorically, for decades.81 Until Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme
Court maintained a relatively consistent commitment to Conley’s notice pleading
rule, twice unanimously rejecting heightened pleading standards in civil rights and
employment discrimination cases.82 The Court acknowledged that there might be
“practical merits” to heightened fact pleading,83 but maintained that such changes
may be obtained only “by the process of amending the Federal Rules,” not by
judicial decree.84
The role of pleading changed with the Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal.
In the former, the Court adopted a “plausibility” standard in an antitrust case,
expressing its concern, specifically in the antitrust context, that liberal pleading
rules combined with expansive discovery would pressure defendants to settle
meritless cases.85 In the Court’s view, careful case management by district courts
had not proven successful at reducing these risks.86 Although many lower courts
took note of Twombly, substantial questions lingered. Some lower courts
considered the possibility that Twombly was limited to cases in which the costs of
discovery were likely to be high and settlement-forcing.87 For others, Twombly was

79. Id. at 48 n.9.
80. Id. at 45–46.
81. Christopher Fairman has argued that notice pleading has rarely been the rule, at least
in practice, pointing to examples from antitrust, RICO, environmental, civil rights,
intellectual property, and defamation cases, among others, in which lower courts have
constructed a variety of heightened pleading standards. See Fairman, supra note 27, at 998–
1011 (summarizing different categories of heightened pleading).
82. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512–13 (2002) (employment
discrimination); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (civil rights); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595
(1998) (“[O]ur cases demonstrate that questions regarding pleading, discovery, and summary
judgment are most frequently and most effectively resolved either by the rulemaking process
or the legislative process.”).
83. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515.
84. Id. (quoting Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168).
85. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S 544, 559–60 (2007); see also Randal C.
Picker, Twombly, Leegin, and the Reshaping of Antitrust, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 177
(arguing Twombly was motivated by concern about discovery “run amok”); Spencer, supra
note 24, at 432, 477 (2008) (describing Twombly as indicative of the Court’s concern in
screening frivolous filings).
86. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.
87. E.g., Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488–89 (6th Cir. 2009)
(suggesting that Twombly was limited to “expensive, complicated litigation” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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interpreted to apply broadly to all civil actions.88 The Court’s decision in Iqbal
resolved this short-lived dispute by making it clear that plausibility pleading
applied in all civil cases, not just antitrust claims.89
Iqbal also articulated a two-step process for evaluating the sufficiency of a
complaint.90 First, courts must review each allegation in a complaint and exclude
from consideration those allegations that are stated in a “conclusory” fashion.91 In
announcing this new gloss on pleading, the Court also held that allegations of state
of mind, despite the explicit language of Rule 9(b),92 must be alleged with some
factual detail.93 After disregarding conclusory allegations, Iqbal’s second step
assesses whether there is a plausible fit between the nonconclusory facts alleged
and the relief claimed.94 Courts applying the plausibility analysis are now instructed
to rely on their “judicial experience and common sense,”95 a surprising turn from
the limited judicial role contemplated in Conley.96
The effect of Iqbal and Twombly taken together is to increase the potential
opportunity to dismiss complaints prior to discovery by application of a test that
assesses the merits of a claim prior to any discovery.97 This in and of itself is

88. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 172 n.6 (2d Cir. 2009); Total Benefits
Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 n.2 (6th Cir.
2008).
89. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 686–87 (interpreting FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) to require more than “general”
allegations for state of mind even where neither fraud nor mistake is alleged).
93. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Notably, the Court had previously distinguished between the
standard for failure to state a claim and the standard for judging frivolousness precisely on the
ground that in the latter, courts may dismiss “based on a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s
factual allegations.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). The power to look behind
factual allegations did not exist (at least until Iqbal) under Rule 12(b)(6). See id.
94. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
95. Id.
96. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957).
97. There is ample empirical evidence demonstrating that defendants file motions to dismiss
more often post-Iqbal as compared to pre-Twombly. See JOE S. CECIL, GEORGE W. CORT,
MARGARET S. WILLIAMS & JARED J. BATAILLON, FED. JUD. CENTER, MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL 8 (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/library/fjc
_catalog.nsf (reporting a 55% increase in the rate at which defendants filed motions to dismiss
between January and June 2010 as compared to January and June 2006). There also is evidence
that the dismissal rate has increased post-Iqbal. See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect:
The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation,
100 KY. L.J. 235 (2011–2012) (reporting that dismissal rates in housing and employment
discrimination cases increased after Iqbal, but not after Twombly); Patricia W. Hatamyar, The
Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556
(2010) (estimating that motions to dismiss with leave to amend were four times more likely to be
granted after Iqbal as they were during the Conley era, after controlling for relevant variables);
Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring Iqbal (August 3, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (reporting data from eleven district courts showing a significant increase in dismissal
rates). But see CECIL ET AL., supra, at 13–14 (reporting an increase in dismissal rates, but finding
that increase was not statistically significant).
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significant because there is no evidence to support the proposition that heightened
pleading standards like those announced in Iqbal and Twombly will serve as an
accurate filter for merit.98 Courts may not be adequately positioned to sort out the
multidimensional balancing necessary to arrive at an optimal pleading standard.99
In other words, one harm flowing from Iqbal and Twombly is that the new pleading
standard will result in dismissal of meritorious cases without the benefit of a more
accurate determination of the meritless case.100 But, as I will expand upon in detail
below, the plausibility pleading standard also will dispose of some meritless cases
in ways that make it harder for those cases to add value to the legal system. That is,
premature dismissal of even meritless cases has harmful legal consequences
beyond the fact that courts will err in predicting ultimate merit.
Like those courts that had flirted with heightened pleading since Conley,101 the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Iqbal and Twombly can be attributed in large part to
the perception that meritless and frivolous cases were proceeding to discovery too
easily under notice pleading.102 Thus, in Twombly the Supreme Court spoke of the

98. See Miller, supra note 22, at 49 (“It seems obvious that in many contexts attempting to
distinguish the frivolous from the potentially meritorious on the basis of a single pleading is a
dangerously uncertain endeavor.”); Suzanna Sherry, The Four Pillars of Constitutional
Doctrine, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 969, 994 & n.102 (2011) (acknowledging that Iqbal and
Twombly may have been directed towards frivolous lawsuits but that there is, “at best, mixed
empirical support” to suggest that heightened pleading “weeds out the frivolous suits while
allowing the weak but potentially meritorious suits to proceed”); Steinman, supra note 67, at
1312 (questioning presumption that “stricter pleading standards are, in fact, well-suited to
identifying which claims are meritorious enough to justify the costs of the discovery process”).
99. See Miller, supra note 22; Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches,
and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157, 164 (2010).
100. Robert Bone recognized this tradeoff well before Iqbal and Twombly, although in so
doing he tended to conflate the meritless and frivolous case category. See Robert G. Bone,
The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural
Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 911 (1999). For instance, in describing the tradeoff between
notice pleading and “strict pleading,” Bone treated meritorious and frivolous as the two
relevant categories of cases, implying that frivolous and meritless cases are one and the
same. Notice pleading, he argued, will make it easier for both meritorious and frivolous
claims to move forward, while a heightened pleading regime will make it harder on both
categories. Id. Thus, “[t]o choose between notice pleading and strict pleading . . . [a
rulemaker] must compare the seriousness of preventing a meritorious suit with the
seriousness of allowing a frivolous suit.” Id.
101. See, e.g., Blaze, supra note 24, at 948–51 (describing development of heightened
pleading in civil rights cases as a response to perception of frivolousness); Bone, supra note
45, at 889–90 (discussing history of using heightened pleading standards in areas where
problem of frivolous filing was thought to be high); Fairman, supra note 27, at 1059
(discussing use of heightened pleading where perception of frivolousness was high);
Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 575–76 (2002)
(describing history of heightened pleading in civil rights cases as means of reducing
frivolous claims); Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered
Questions, 23 GA. L. REV. 597, 657 (1989) (noting that some courts have imposed fact
pleading to address perception that many constitutional torts are frivolous).
102. See Spencer, supra note 24, at 450–54 (discussing the “pleading policy” in Twombly
of “screening of frivolous cases”); Benjamin P. Cooper, Iqbal’s Retro Revolution, 46 WAKE
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“threat [that] discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even
anemic cases.”103 And in Iqbal the Court appealed to the imagery of a felonious
plaintiff, “unlock[ing] the doors of discovery . . . armed with nothing more than
conclusions.”104 Moreover, the Supreme Court was concerned that in the specific
context of cases against federal officials, litigation and discovery were time and
resource intensive, undermining “proper execution of the work of the
Government.”105 Notably, the concerns expressed in Iqbal and Twombly mirror
those voiced twenty years earlier, when the Supreme Court modified summary
judgment as a result of concerns about meritless and frivolous litigation.106
Iqbal and Twombly have sparked a vigorous debate about the proper role of
pleading. Those who defend the new rules often point to the increased costs that
meritless and frivolous cases place on the judicial system and defendants.107 Others
support the new pleading standards because they increase efficiency by eliminating
baseless claims as early as possible.108 Detractors have argued that the Court,
FOREST L. REV. 937, 961 (2011) (describing Iqbal and Rule 11 as addressed to problem of
frivolous cases).
103. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). The Court also referred back to
its decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals, which expressed the fear that a plaintiff with “a largely
groundless claim” will be able to extract “an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.” Id.
at 557–58 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).
104. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 685.
106. See generally Bone, supra note 22, at 521 (describing the Court’s emphasis on
summary judgment and case management as proper tools to eliminate frivolous suits); Eric K.
Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 375 (1990) (discussing how the summary judgment trilogy was aimed
at eliminating meritless litigating earlier in process in the name of efficiency); see also
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43 GA.
L. REV. 63, 78–79 (2008) (mentioning Rules 11, 12, and 56 as solutions for frivolous cases);
Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem:
Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849 (2004) (discussing the problem of
frivolous cases and advocating mandatory summary judgment such that settlements can occur
only after summary judgment review); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an
Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1684 (2008) (noting that
summary judgment, among other methods, is used by courts to dispose of supposed frivolous
civil rights claims).
107. See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1067
(2009); Tony Mauro, Plaintiffs Groups Mount Effort to Undo Supreme Court’s ‘Iqbal’ Ruling,
NAT’L L.J. (N.Y.C.), Sept. 21, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp
/article.jsp?id=1202433931370 (“Business advocates say that Iqbal weeds out weak or
frivolous lawsuits and is a much-needed standard that will reduce federal court caseloads.”);
Lisa A. Rickard, Repealing Iqbal and Twombly: Understanding the Physics of Politics,
TOWNHALL.COM (July 15, 2010), http://townhall.com/columnists/lisaarickard/2010/07/15
/repealing_iqbal_and_twombly_understanding_the_physics_of_politics/page/full (“Reversing
Iqbal and Twombly would increase the already-excessive litigation burdens on businesses in
this country—small and large alike—diverting resources that would otherwise be used to create
jobs and strengthen our nation’s economy.”).
108. See Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly Is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v.
Eldridge Test to Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2010) (maintaining that plaintiff's
interest in cases like Twombly is minimal because it is unlikely plaintiff has a valid claim);
Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 441, 465
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perhaps inadvertently, has imported standards from Rule 11 into the Rule 12(b)(6)
context.109 And given the Court’s skepticism in Iqbal towards the effectiveness of
Rule 11 as a deterrent to frivolous filings, perhaps it should be no surprise that it
has recruited Rules 8 and 12 to solidify the barricades against baseless claims.110
Some critics of Iqbal and Twombly acknowledge the potential efficiency benefits to
heightened pleading but are doubtful that the decisions strike the right balance.111
Even in their critiques, however, these commentators elide the distinction between
meritless and frivolous claims.112
(2010) (citing efficiency goals as one justification for fact pleading); Geoffrey P. Miller,
Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 165, 167 (listing heightened pleading as one
approach for filtering “weak or frivolous cases”); Smith, supra note 107, at 1067; Stancil, supra
note 59, at 169 (suggesting that for certain kinds of cases heightened pleading can “reduce the
cost disparities that can sometimes induce plaintiffs to file frivolous claims”).
109. See Bradley Scott Shannon, I Have Federal Pleading All Figured Out, 61 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 453, 489 (2011) (“[O]ne almost gets the sense that the Court’s plausibility
standard, perhaps inadvertently, is intended to serve as a sort of proxy for a plaintiff’s
obligations under Rule 11.”). As Shannon notes, if the problem in Iqbal and Twombly was
whether the plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficiently supported by facts, Rule 11(b)(3) should
suffice. Id. at 489–90.
110. The following colloquy from oral argument in Iqbal is revealing:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: How about Rule 11 to take care of Justice Breyer’s
problem? The judge would say to the lawyer: Now, you signed this pleading, and
when you made—you signed it, you made certain representations, and I’m going
to read the Riot Act to you if it turns out that this is a frivolous petition.
GENERAL GARRE: Sure. That’s one protection, Justice Ginsburg. . . .
...
...
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Reading the Riot Act to the lawyer is protection
against the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI after they’re hauled in
for discovery or subjected to depositions and the judge finds out—
GENERAL GARRE: We—
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I’m sorry, Mr. Garre.
—the judge finds out that there wasn’t in fact a sufficient basis for it, and
that—that will show them, if they get read the Riot Act by a judge?
GENERAL GARRE: It's certainly not adequate protection, Mr. Chief Justice.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: I was responding to Justice Breyer's Coca-Cola
president. I think Rule 11 would work quite well to answer that.
GENERAL GARRE: I would have thought that this Court's decision in Bell
Atlantic put an end to those sorts of claims . . . .
Transcript of Oral Argument at 20–21, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (No.
07-1015).
111. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 18
(2009) (stating that one principle that might justify heightened pleading is efficiency, which
“acknowledges that litigating meritless claims beyond the pleading stage wastes valuable time
and money and thus it is important to screen out such claims at the earliest possible stage of the
litigation”).
112. For instance, A. Benjamin Spencer has argued that Twombly (and by extension Iqbal)
erred in its calibration between efficiency and justice for several reasons, including that the
instability created by the plausibility standard will “underdeter frivolous claims and
overencourage motions to dismiss,” and that the plausibility standard will bar truly meritorious
claims. Id. at 26–30.
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What everyone seems to agree on is that Iqbal and Twombly were motivated by
the specter of frivolous and meritless litigation.113 But true to many of the changes I
will discuss in this Article, the Court’s holdings treat both categories of cases as
equally harmful. The highest priority is eliminating such cases from the federal
docket as soon as possible. As the Court sees it, judicial resources should be
reserved instead for the deserving plaintiffs with meritorious claims.114
2. Conflation in Qualified Immunity Doctrine
Qualified immunity in constitutional tort suits, a judicially created doctrine, also
tends to conflate the frivolous with the meritless suit. Qualified immunity is a
common-law concept, initially applied in the Bivens context, that offers protection
from personal liability to government defendants who have not had “fair warning”
that their conduct violated the law.115 The doctrine originally required that the
plaintiff establish that the defendant officer acted in bad faith before imposing
damages liability.116 But in the 1980s, it shifted from this subjective standard to a
defense based on objective reasonableness, precisely because the defense was
perceived to have been ineffective in reducing both frivolous and meritless claims
against government officials.117 In justifying this shift, the Supreme Court

113. See Bone, supra note 24, at 851 (arguing that Iqbal extends Twombly because
“Twombly uses plausibility to screen only for truly meritless suits, but Iqbal uses it to screen
for weak lawsuits too”); Hoffman, supra note 10, at 1231–33 (describing “high discovery
expenses” and “nonmeritorious litigation” as Twombly’s “animating policy purposes”);
Kenneth S. Klein, Removing the Blindfold and Tipping the Scales: The Unintended Lesson of
Ashcroft v. Iqbal Is that Frivolous Lawsuits May Be Important to Our Nation, 41 RUTGERS
L.J. 593, 605 (2010) [hereinafter Klein, Removing the Blindfold] (arguing that the Court in
Iqbal was attempting to regulate frivolous lawsuits); Kenneth S. Klein, Is Ashcroft v. Iqbal the
Death (Finally) of the “Historical Test” For Interpreting the Seventh Amendment?, 88 NEB.
L. REV. 467, 469 (2010) (“Iqbal is a none-too-subtle signal from the Court that it is interested
in utilizing Rule 12(b)(6) motions as a gate-keeping device to regulate potentially frivolous
litigation . . . .”); Lemos, supra note 60, at 829–30 (characterizing Iqbal and Twombly as
responses to concerns about “meritless strike suits”); Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E.
Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public
Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107, 1109 (2010)
(describing Iqbal and Twombly as reflecting the purpose of protection “against frivolous and
purely speculative lawsuits” because such claims burden the judicial system and defendants,
and “delay[] justice for meritorious cases”).
114. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560 n.6 (2007) (discussing
burden on judges of managing discovery flowing from insubstantial claims).
115. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536
U.S. 730, 739–40 (2002) (“[T]he defendant [is] entitled to ‘fair warning’ that his conduct
deprived his victim of a constitutional right . . . .”); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)
(“If the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful,
summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate.”); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
603, 621 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing a state
judge who had fair warning when eliciting sexual favors from a potential litigant).
116. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
117. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816–19; see also Stephen W. Miller, Note, Rethinking Prisoner
Litigation: Shifting from Qualified Immunity to a Good Faith Defense in § 1983 Prisoner
Lawsuits, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 929, 930–31 (2009).
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emphasized its concern with frivolous and meritless cases, noting that
constitutional tort claims “frequently run against the innocent as well as the
guilty,”118 that “ingenious plaintiff’s counsel” are able to create material issues of
fact based on scant evidence,119 and that immunity is necessary to terminate
“insubstantial” suits.120 The defense now protects “all but the plainly incompetent”
officers from a damages suit for constitutional violations.121
Qualified immunity thus plays two significant roles in mapping the terrain of
frivolous and meritless cases. First, as noted above and as commentators have
recognized, qualified immunity is premised largely on the assumption that many
constitutional tort claims are frivolous or meritless.122 At the same time, qualified
immunity transforms an otherwise meritorious claim of constitutional violation into
a meritless one. Under Harlow and its progeny, defendants can establish the

118. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814; cf. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 91 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (describing “torrent of frivolous” constitutional tort claims); Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 425 (1976) (reasoning that in the absence of immunity, suits against
prosecutors “could be expected with some frequency, for a defendant often will transform
his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions to
the State’s advocate”).
119. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817 n.29 (quoting Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1214
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (Gesell, J., concurring), aff’d by an equally divided court, 452 U.S. 713 (1981)).
120. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507–08 (1978); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (using same language); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 165–166 (1992)
(same); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 n.2 (1987) (same); Harrison v. Ash, 539
F.3d 510, 523 (6th Cir. 2008) (qualified immunity protects against frivolous litigation);
Gregoire v. Class, 236 F.3d 413, 417 (8th Cir. 2000) (same); Hemphill v. Schott, 141 F.3d 412,
420 (2d Cir. 1998) (same); Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 757 F.2d
676, 686 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); Maiorana v. MacDonald, 596 F.2d 1072, 1077 (1st Cir. 1979)
(“There are two competing considerations bearing on whether summary judgment should be
granted in civil rights cases where qualified immunity is asserted. The traditional reluctance to
grant summary judgment in cases involving state of mind issues (such as good faith) is
counterbalanced by the desirability of screening out frivolous actions through the summary
judgment filter so as not to discourage officials from taking necessary and decisive action.”).
The need to protect defendants from the burdens of meritless and frivolous suits has
additionally been used to justify interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity decisions at every
procedural stage, thus guaranteeing that a plaintiff must be patient to dream of achieving a
favorable judgment. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996).
121. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
122. See Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the
Role of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1997); Diana Hassel, Living
a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 MO. L. REV. 123, 131 (1999); Courtney W.
Howland, The Hands-Off Policy and Intramilitary Torts, 71 IOWA L. REV. 93, 151–52 (1985);
Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. REV. 53,
143; Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23
GA. L. REV. 597, 611 (1989); Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional Torts, Over-Deterrence and
Supervisory Liability After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 279, 287 (2010); H. Allen Black,
Note, Balance, Band-Aid, or Tourniquet: The Illusion of Qualified Immunity for Federal
Officials, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 733, 748–49 (1991); Chad Howell, Note, Qualified
Discovery: How Ashcroft v. Iqbal Endangers Discovery When Civil Rights Plaintiffs File Suit
Against Government Officials, 21 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 299, 302 (2011).
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affirmative defense of qualified immunity through one of two routes: (1) by
showing that the defendant’s conduct did not violate law that was clearly
established at the time she acted; or (2) by showing that the defendant reasonably
believed that her conduct did not violate clearly established law.123 If a defendant
can prevail on either prong, then she is entitled to qualified immunity.124 In other
words, a plaintiff may be able to show that the defendant violated the Constitution,
but if the law was not clearly established at the time of the violation, the plaintiff’s
complaint will be dismissed.125
The relationship between clearly established law and the underlying
constitutional violation is the aspect of qualified immunity that relates most directly
to the argument pursued in this Article. If a court finds that particular law is not
clearly established, it need never decide whether a particular set of allegations
states a claim for a violation of the Constitution. This tension was less of a concern
when the Supreme Court adhered to a “rigid order of battle” that required lower
courts to first decide whether the plaintiff had established a violation of the
Constitution before addressing whether the law was clearly established at the time
of the violation.126 But in 2009 the Court changed course, holding that lower courts
are free to decide first the state of clearly established law.127 The Court recognized
that this shift had the potential to stunt the development of constitutional law but
justified the shift in part on the original grounds for the qualified immunity defense:
the need to protect defendants from the burdens of meritless litigation.128
3. Conflation in In Forma Pauperis Litigation
One final example of transsubstantive conflation of frivolous and meritless
litigation can be found in legislative changes to screening of complaints filed in
forma pauperis. Prior to 1996, cases filed in federal court by individuals who could

123. See Malley, 475 U.S. at 341.
124. At least superficially, qualified immunity is an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Gomez
v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The defendant always has some minimal burden to
establish an entitlement to the defense, but some circuits, as discussed in greater detail
below, have adopted variations of a burden-shifting scheme that places much of the burden
of rebutting the defense on the plaintiff.
125. For some commentators, this is sufficient to treat cases dismissed on qualified
immunity grounds as frivolous. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About
Officer Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 503–05 (2011). In my view, it is more accurate
to say that qualified immunity redistributes the burdens of constitutional violations by
making otherwise meritorious constitutional claims unsuccessful.
126. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (describing qualified immunity analysis adopted in Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001)).
127. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
128. Id. at 237 (noting that the Saucier rule “disserves the purpose of qualified immunity
when it forces the parties to endure additional burdens of suit . . . when the suit otherwise
could be disposed of more readily” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). This
was not the only reason for the Court’s shift from Saucier to Pearson: the Court also was
concerned with the problem of advisory opinions and, more broadly, deciding difficult
constitutional questions prematurely. Id. at 237–38.
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not afford the filing fee were screened (pre-filing and pre-answer) for
frivolousness.129 When the Supreme Court interpreted this provision in 1992, it
specifically held that frivolous claims were distinct from claims that failed to state a
claim for relief within the meaning of Rule 12(b)(6).130 In Neitzke, the Court held
that although there was “considerable” overlap between the failure-to-state-a-claim
standard and the frivolousness standard, “it does not follow that a complaint which
falls afoul of the former standard will invariably fall afoul of the latter.”131
There were three reasons that the Court cautioned against the “conflat[ion of]
the standards of frivolousness and failure to state a claim.”132 First, the Court
distinguished between the ability of courts to dismiss for frivolousness “based on a
judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations,” power that did not exist (at
least until Iqbal) under Rule 12(b)(6).133 Second, the Court recognized that
substantial legal questions could exist in cases resolved under Rule 12(b)(6)
motions: “To term these claims frivolous is to distort measurably the meaning of
frivolousness both in common and legal parlance.”134 Finally, Nietzke emphasized
that the procedural protections provided at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage—notice, an
opportunity to oppose the motion, and an opportunity to amend or clarify a
complaint—ensure a complete record and careful and thorough decision making.135
In 1996, Congress amended the in forma pauperis statute.136 Whereas the statute
previously had required courts to screen solely for frivolous or malicious filings,
now such cases are screened for being frivolous, for failing to state a claim, and for
seeking damages from a defendant who is immune from liability.137 In other words,
Congress legislated to conflate meritless and frivolous litigation in the same way
rejected by the Court in Nietzke.
B. Context-Specific Conflation
Contrary to the transsubstantive rules reviewed above, many of the rules
adopted by legislators and judges are subject-matter specific. The area that has
received perhaps the most attention in federal courts has been prisoners’ rights
litigation, and I will begin there before moving to examples from securities
litigation and antitrust. This review demonstrates that both Congress and the courts
have constructed procedural and substantive rules that treat meritless and frivolous
litigation as equally troublesome.

129. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (1996) (providing that cases could be dismissed
sua sponte for being frivolous or malicious).
130. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325–27 (1992).
131. Id. at 326.
132. Id. at 330.
133. Id. at 327.
134. Id. at 328–29.
135. Id. at 329–30.
136. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 804(a)(5), 110
Stat. 1321, 1321-74 (2006).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (2006).
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1. Prisoners’ Rights Litigation
It is not hard to find examples of conflation of the meritless with the frivolous in
the area of prisoners’ rights. At the federal level, the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) accomplishes this in at least three ways.138 First, the PLRA has pre-answer
screening procedures that treat both categories of cases the same.139 Second, the
PLRA contains a repeat filer provision that penalizes prisoners for filing previously
dismissed litigation, whether frivolous or simply meritless.140 And finally, the
PLRA imposes an exhaustion requirement that was prompted by concerns about
frivolous litigation but functions to filter out cases of all types.141 Importantly, each
of these provisions, like the PLRA itself, was intended to reduce frivolous filings
by prisoners.142
Like the in forma pauperis statute already discussed, the PLRA’s screening
procedure mandates that courts examine all prisoner filings before docketing or as
soon as possible to determine whether they are frivolous, fail to state a claim for
relief, or seek damages from a defendant who is immune from damages suits.143
One can appreciate the need to screen complaints for frivolousness as soon as
possible—after all, frivolousness should, in some cases, be capable of being
determined on the face of a complaint. But screening for meritlessness—either
because a complaint fails to state a claim or because it seeks a remedy against a
defendant who is immune from suit—suggests that from the legislation’s
perspective such claims are as harmful as frivolous claims and offer no benefit.144
The advantages of having a judge resolve the merit of a case by motion are
manifold. First of all, a judge might, by screening for failure to state a claim or for
substantive immunity, end up adjudicating an affirmative defense before a
defendant has even shouldered the burden of establishing it.145 Qualified immunity

138. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. at 1321-66 to -77
(1996) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2012); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624, 3626 (2012); 28
U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1915, 1915A (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997–1997h (2006)). As I will discuss
below, many states also have adopted analogs to the Federal PLRA. See infra notes 162–65
and accompanying text.
139. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b).
140. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
142. See Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1299 (2011) (describing three-strikes
provision and exhaustion provision as intended to “prevent sportive filings in federal court”);
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 97 (2006) (“[T]he PLRA . . . was intended to deal with what
was perceived as a disruptive tide of frivolous prisoner litigation . . . . ”); Porter v. Nussle,
534 U.S. 516, 524–25 (2002) (noting that Congress enacted the PLRA “to reduce the
quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits”); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 737
(2001) (explaining that exhaustion provision designed to filter frivolous claims).
143. This provision applies regardless of whether the prisoner has paid the full filing fee
or is proceeding in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b).
144. Indeed, it is unclear that courts are even distinguishing frivolousness from failure to
state a claim in their screening function. See, e.g., Thorpe v. Little, 804 F. Supp. 2d 174, 185
(D. Del. 2011).
145. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Snavely, 453 F. App’x 140 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming § 1915A
dismissal based on statute of limitations); Terry v. Bailey, 376 F. App’x 894, 895 n.2 (11th
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is an affirmative defense that typically must be asserted and shown by the
defendant.146 The same goes for some defenses that are adjudicated as Rule
12(b)(6) motions, such as statute of limitations or res judicata.147 Importantly, the
establishment of either of these defenses does not necessarily detract from the
underlying merit of a plaintiff’s complaint. And if a defendant consciously or
erroneously forfeits any of these defenses, a plaintiff’s suit may go forward for a
determination of the merits. Accordingly, the PLRA encourages courts to
prematurely resolve cases involving prisoners’ rights because of the overriding goal
of eliminating frivolous litigation.
Moreover, pre-screening complaints for failure to state a claim for relief may
lead to worse decision making. After Iqbal and Twombly, resolving failure to state
a claim issues is notoriously complex.148 Doing so in the absence of any briefing by
the parties creates an unnecessary risk of error. Even before those cases, the
Supreme Court adverted to the importance of adjudicating failure-to-state-a-claim
dismissals in the context of adversarial briefing because of the opportunity it
provides a litigant to amend or otherwise clarify his complaint.149 Finally,
pre-screening tends to occur under the radar of reported decisions or even fully
reasoned written opinions.150 Thus, to the extent that the adjudication of meritless
cases can provide guidance to future actors within the legal system, pre-screening
deprives the legal universe of that benefit.
Perhaps even more indicative of legislative conflation of frivolous and meritless
cases in the PLRA is the statute’s three-strikes provision, which bars a plaintiff
from filing a lawsuit in forma pauperis if he has previously had three complaints
dismissed for being frivolous, failing to state a claim, or for seeking damages from
an immune defendant.151 Thus, whatever the merits of a particular plaintiff’s
lawsuit, a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds, exhaustion grounds, or
immunity will be treated as equivalent to a claim that was frivolous. The
implication of the three-strikes provision is clear: from Congress’s perspective, a
meritless claim is just as harmful as a frivolous one and to be equally sanctioned.

Cir. 2010) (affirming on alternative grounds lower court decision that entered § 1915A
dismissal based on qualified immunity); Okpala v. Drew, 248 F. App’x 72 (11th Cir. 2007)
(affirming § 1915A dismissal on exhaustion grounds because the affirmative defense
appeared on the face of the complaint); Tijerina v. Patterson, 244 F. App’x 235 (10th Cir.
2007) (affirming § 1915A dismissal based on qualified immunity); Butts v. Wilkinson, No.
96-4280, 1998 WL 152778, at *1 (6th Cir. 1998) (affirming § 1915A dismissal on res
judicata and statute of limitations grounds).
146. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639–41 (1980); cf. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523
U.S. 574, 586–87 (1998).
147. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
148. See supra notes 90–101 and accompanying text.
149. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329–30 (1989) (summarizing advantages of
procedures provided in ordinary Rule 12(b)(6) motion practice).
150. See Henry F. Fradella, In Search of Meritorious Claims: A Study of the Processing
of Prisoner Civil Rights Cases in a Federal District Court, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 23, 27 (1999)
(“The overwhelming majority of prisoner civil rights cases are disposed by unpublished
memorandum decisions . . . .”).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2006). This provision contains an exception for prisoners
under “imminent danger of serious physical injury.”
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Finally, the PLRA imposes an exhaustion requirement in prison cases that
distinguishes prisoner litigation from all other civil rights claims.152 Exhaustion of
administrative remedies is typically not required in most civil rights litigation.153
The principal articulated reason for imposing this mandatory requirement on
prisoners was to reduce the quantity of “frivolous” prisoner suits.154 Even before
the PLRA was enacted in 1996, federal courts viewed exhaustion as a means to
separate out the meritorious cases from the “frivolous” ones.155 As many judges
and legislators saw it, adjudicating prisoner suits was like looking for the one
meritorious needle in the haystack of frivolous litigation.156
The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, however, does not distinguish between
frivolous and nonfrivolous cases. No exception exists for cases that a judge
believes are likely to have merit, and even where a prisoner seeks remedies that
cannot be provided by a prison’s internal grievance procedure, the exhaustion
requirement is strictly imposed.157 The result is a scattershot approach to reducing
prison litigation, likely to equally limit frivolous, meritless, and meritorious
litigation. The Supreme Court has assumed, however, that exhaustion and other
PLRA provisions will draw a useful line between frivolous/meritless claims on one
hand and meritorious claims on the other.158
Exhaustion requirements are not unique to prison cases. They have been
legislatively imposed in employment discrimination cases, challenges to agency
determinations, and for tort claims against federal, state, and local government
entities, among others.159 Exhaustion has been judicially imposed in ERISA cases
and some agency proceedings.160 In general, however, the justification for

152. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006); see also Schlanger, supra note 41, at 1635 n.272
(listing states that had enacted statutes similar to the PLRA as of 2003). As of 2003, only
Alabama, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Nebraska, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Wyoming had failed to pass a state analog to the PLRA. Since then, none of
these states has imposed a state-based exhaustion requirement for prisoners.
153. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
154. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 97 (2006) (“[T]he PLRA . . . was intended to deal
with what was perceived as a disruptive tide of frivolous prisoner litigation . . . . ”); Porter v.
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524–25 (2002) (noting that Congress enacted the PLRA “to reduce the
quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits”); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 737
(2001) (explaining that exhaustion provision designed to filter frivolous claims).
155. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 535 (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing motivation for
predecessor to PLRA).
156. See Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in Haystacks,
62 BROOK. L. REV. 519, 520–22 (1996).
157. Ngo, 548 U.S. at 97; Booth, 532 U.S. at 737.
158. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007) (observing that most prison litigation
cases, which as of 2005 accounted for almost ten percent of all civil cases filed in federal
court, “have no merit” and “many are frivolous,” and that “[t]he challenge lies in ensuring
that the flood of nonmeritorious claims does not submerge and effectively preclude
consideration of the allegations with merit”).
159. See United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 36 n.6 (1952)
(collecting statutes); Wash. Ass’n for Television & Children v. FCC, 712 F.2d 677, 681–82
& n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (collecting statutes).
160. See, e.g., L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. at 33 (Interstate Commerce
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exhaustion in these contexts has not revolved around the reduction of frivolous
litigation, and the exhaustion requirements are much less draconian than the
parallel PLRA requirements.161 As such, exhaustion in these contexts poses less of
a risk of blindly condemning frivolous and nonfrivolous litigation.
These restrictions on prisoner litigation are not limited to the federal courts.
Many of the provisions found in the PLRA have been adopted in states that seek to
limit prisoners’ rights litigation. Thus, many states have pre-screening provisions
that are identical to the PLRA.162 And three-strikes provisions are common at the
state level as well.163 Indeed, in South Carolina, a prisoner who violates the threestrikes provision may be sentenced to a year’s imprisonment, in addition to the
prisoner’s current sentence.164 Finally, many states also have exhaustion
requirements that are similar to the PLRA’s.165
Commission); Unemployment Comp. Comm’n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143 (1946)
(unemployment compensation commission); Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557–59
(1941) (Board of Tax Appeals); Paese v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins., 449 F.3d 435, 445 (2d
Cir. 2006) (ERISA); see also Gregory C. Braden, Andrew G. Sakallaris & Michael R.
Maryn, What’s New in Employee Benefits in 2008: A Summary of Current Case Law
Developments, in PENSION, PROFIT-SHARING, WELFARE, AND OTHER COMPENSATION P LANS 1,
108 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, 2009) (enumerating ERISA cases requiring plaintiffs to
exhaust administrative remedies).
161. Judicially imposed exhaustion requirements are typically based on an analogy to
appellate courts refraining from passing on issues not raised in the court below. See Sims v.
Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 109–10 (2000) (describing situations in which judicially imposed
exhaustion requirements are appropriate); Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866,
878–79 (1998) (rejecting efficiency argument for exhaustion). As such, courts are more
likely to impose exhaustion where there is no legislative intent to preclude exhaustion and
where an administrative proceeding is adversarial. Sims, 530 U.S. at 109–10; Darby v.
Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 144–46 (1993) (finding that APA precluded exhaustion). For
instance, traditional exceptions to the exhaustion requirement in other contexts––futility, bias
of the ultimate decision maker, hardship, and inadequate remedies––do not apply in PLRA
cases. Compare Booth, 532 U.S. at 737 (rejecting futility exception to exhaustion), and Ngo,
548 U.S. at 97 (requiring “proper” exhaustion under PLRA), with Sims, 530 U.S. at 115
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (constitutional claims), Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care,
Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (futility), McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 147–48 (1992)
(futility and biased decision maker), and McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 197–201
(1969) (balancing interests in applying exhaustion rule against hardship imposed as a result).
162. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-106-302(b) (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.085(6)(a),
(6)(d) (West 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 31-3220A(14) (2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-13-71(c) (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1188(A) (2005); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 5-1004(b) (LexisNexis 2013); MO. ANN. STAT. § 506.381 (West 2003); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 802.05(4)(b) (West 2013).
163. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-68-607 (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-17.5102.7(1) (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8804(f) (Supp. 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. §
610A.1(1)(e) (West Supp. 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1187 (2005); MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-1004(b) (LexisNexis 2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-5-76(1) (West
2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 566.2(A) (West 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.645(1)
(2011) (limited to IFP plaintiffs); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-300 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. §
41-21-807(c) (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-692 (2007) (limited to IFP plaintiffs); W. VA.
CODE, § 25-1A-4(a) (LexisNexis 2013).
164. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-300.
165. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.19.200(a) (2012) (requiring exhaustion for prospective
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2. Securities Litigation
Although prisoners’ rights litigation has been a source of much legislation that
treats meritless and frivolous litigation as one and the same, there are other areas of
substantive law that Congress has deemed appropriate for similar treatment. The
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), for example, was passed
because of the perception that frivolous and meritless securities class action claims
were pressuring defendants into unjust settlements.166 When it summarized the
logic behind the PSLRA, Congress lumped abusive, frivolous, and meritless
lawsuits together as equally damaging to the public, the courts, investors, and
issuers of securities.167 Legislators thought that Rule 11 was not used sufficiently
often to deter such lawsuits.168 Accordingly, the PSLRA set out to increase

relief); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-106-301; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-17.5-102.3(1); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 8804(g); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4206(1); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
15:1184(A)(2); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-1003(a)(1); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.5503(1) (West 1996); MO. REV. STAT. §510.125(1) (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148118.2(b) (West 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57 § 564.1(A) (West Supp. 2013) (requiring
exhaustion for challenges to rescission of good-time credits); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57 §
566.3(G) (West 2004 & Supp. 2013) (requiring exhaustion for all prisoner claims); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 21-62-2 (Supp. 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 801.02(7)(b).
166. See Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act)
More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 51–53 (1998).
167. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31–32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730
(justifying the PSLRA by reference to “abusive and meritless suits,” “abusive and
manipulative securities litigation,” and “frivolous litigation,” none of which was thought to
be sufficiently managed by Rule 11). There was, as to be expected, some disagreement about
the extent of the problem of frivolous litigation in the area of securities law. Private
Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 280 (1993) (statement of Sen.
Dodd) (“[A]fter a long hearing that lasted well into the afternoon, we found no agreement on
whether there is in fact a problem, the extent of the problem, or the solution to the
problem.”). Compare Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements
in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991) (reporting a study of nine
settlements in cases filed related to IPOs of computer and computer-related companies and
concluding that the settlement value of litigation is related more to the nuisance value of
litigation than to its merits), with Joel Seligman, Commentary, The Merits Do Matter: A
Comment on Professor Grundfest’s “Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the
Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority,” 108 HARV. L. REV. 438, 445–48
(1994) (arguing that federal courts did not need additional tools to address meritless
securities litigation), and id. at 449–55 (criticizing studies that purport to show companies
settling regardless of merit, including Alexander’s, on both methodological and analytical
grounds). Subsequent empirical analyses have cast doubt on the proposition that settlement
of securities actions is unrelated to merit. See Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less
After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 600 (2007)
(concluding that despite Congress’s intent the PSLRA likely deterred the filing of a
substantial number of meritorious cases); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the
Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1631 n.153 (2006).
168. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 39.
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obstacles to securities litigation so as to reduce the quantity and improve the quality
of filed cases.169
Most significantly, the PSLRA heightened pleading standards for securities
class actions based on fraud, on the theory that it was too easy to allege fraud in the
context of securities class actions. Any claim involving fraud must provide certain
specific allegations about the statements alleged to have been misleading and also
“state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind.”170 As commentators have recognized, many
courts have interpreted this pleading standard to require evidence, not simply wellpleaded allegations, and many courts have interpreted the PSLRA in ways that
discount circumstantial evidence of fraud.171 Altering the usual procedural course,
the statute also provides for a stay of all discovery—in fraud and nonfraud cases—
during the pendency of a motion to dismiss.172 In addition, to prevent abusive
litigation, the PSLRA imposes certain filing obligations that ensure that lead
plaintiffs are not “professional plaintiffs” because of the perception that lawyers
recruit plaintiffs to purchase shares of stock and then serve as named
representatives to earn a higher share of any recovery.173 Finally, the statute imports
a loss causation element as part of any plaintiff’s burden of proof and also imposes
a cap on damages.174 And the statute alters the usual rule on joint and several
liability to limit the pressure on “innocent” defendants to settle “meritless”
litigation.175
Aside from these substantive provisions, the statute includes additional tools for
courts to sanction attorneys and parties for violating Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11. These include mandatory review of filings upon final adjudication of
the action,176 mandatory sanctions for any such violations,177 and a presumptive

169. See id. at 32–35 (describing goal of improving quality of representation in
shareholder suits); id. at 39 (acknowledging “need to reduce significantly the filing of
meritless securities lawsuits without hindering the ability of victims of fraud to pursue
legitimate claims”).
170. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(a) (2012); see id. § 78u-4(b)(1) (describing pleading
standard for misleading statements and omissions); id. § 78u-4(b)(2) (describing pleading
standard for alleging required state of mind).
171. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Judicial Access Barriers to
Remedies for Securities Fraud, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2012, at 55, 57–59.
172. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B); id. § 77z-1(b)(1); H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 37
(explaining that stay of discovery was intended to prevent the cost of discovery to pressure
settlement of a “frivolous” case).
173. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(ii), (v), (vi) (providing that plaintiff provide a
statement certifying that he did not purchase securities at direction of counsel, identifying the
prior actions in which the plaintiff has sought to serve as a class representative, and promising
not to accept any payment beyond his pro rata share); id. § 77z-1(a)(2)(A)(ii), (v), (vi) (same);
see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 33 (“The Conference Committee believes these practices
[(filing by professional plaintiffs)] have encouraged the filing of abusive cases.”).
174. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4), (e)(1).
175. See id. § 78u-4(f); H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 37–39.
176. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1); id. § 77z-1(c)(1).
177. See id. § 78u-4(c)(2); id. § 77z-1(c)(2).
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award of attorneys’ fees and costs in the event of a Rule 11 violation.178 According
to the legislative history, these provisions were necessary to strengthen the
deterrence against the filing of “meritless” or “abusive” litigation.179
It is possible, of course, that Congress intended these provisions to be directed
solely at frivolous, but not meritless, claims. But given that Congress legislated
beyond the goal of giving more teeth to Rule 11, this likely only tells part of the
story. It is more likely, given the legislative history, that Congress intended to treat
frivolous and meritless cases the same. Pleading rules that derail a likely loser early
on, class action provisions that magnify the scrutiny of plaintiffs and their counsel
and limit the recovery of named plaintiffs, discovery rules that limit costs necessary
to defend insubstantial claims, and damages provisions that make it more difficult
to recover all have the effect of both limiting the burden of meritless claims and, to
some extent, redefining the meaning of merit itself. That these new rules also
appear to have made it more difficult to bring meritorious claims only heightens the
extent to which legislative perception of the need to regulate frivolousness has
broad and undesirable consequences.180
3. Antitrust Litigation
Antitrust is another substantive area in which frivolous and meritless litigation is
often conflated. Courts are suspicious that run-of-the mill fraud or contract claims
are sometimes framed as antitrust violations, because of the availability of treble
damages that can lead to coerced settlements.181 Indeed, the Court has explicitly
linked the imposition of heightened pleading in all antitrust claims to the concern
about groundless and frivolous litigation leading to coerced settlements.182 The

178. See id. § 78u-4(c)(3); id. § 77z-1(c)(3).
179. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 39–40.
180. See Choi, supra note 167, at 600.
181. See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (“The line between antitrust claims and ordinary business tort and contract claims is
not always clear.”), rev’d on other grounds, 546 U.S. 394 (2006); E. Food Servs., Inc. v.
Pontifical Catholic Univ. Servs. Ass’n, 357 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[A]ntitrust claims are
concerned not with wrongs directed against the private interest of an individual business but
with conduct that stifles competition.”); Doctor’s Hosp. of Jefferson, Inc. v. Se. Med.
Alliance, Inc., 123 F.3d 301, 306 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that standing doctrine serves goal of
distinguishing ordinary tort and contract actions from true antitrust claims); Reisner v.
General Motors Corp., 511 F. Supp. 1167, 1178 n.25 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (“Numerous cases are
filed in the federal district courts attempting to make antitrust claims out of what are, at
most, contract claims or fraud claims involving conduct between two parties.”); Bucher v.
Shumway, 452 F. Supp. 1288, 1291–93 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (fixing the price of a particular
securities purchase was not cognizable under the antitrust laws); Madison Fund, Inc. v.
Charter Co., 406 F. Supp. 749, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (antitrust laws “not designed to police
the performance of private contracts”); Edward D. Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages:
An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 777, 815 (1987) (arguing that the
availability of treble damages for antitrust violations “encourages filing of claims which are
at best marginal and at worst frivolous”).
182. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007); Dura Pharm., Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005).
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Court even has relied upon a desire not to undermine the PSLRA’s specific
approach to securities litigation reform, when it refused to extend antitrust liability
against underwriters who market and distribute IPOs.183 Similarly, the Court’s
standing doctrine in antitrust cases can be linked to concerns about frivolous
litigation in combination with a treble damages regime.184
In addition, the Supreme Court has increasingly framed changes in substantive
antitrust law—definitions of merit—as a response to perceived threats of frivolous
and abusive litigation.185 Take the Court’s turn from per se rules in antitrust law to
the rule of reason. On one account, the Court’s transition can be seen as an embrace
of neoclassical economics and the Chicago School’s account that, in a competitive
market, the false negatives that may increase under a rule of reason standard are
less problematic than the false positives that are increased using a per se rule.186 On
the other hand, the Court also has explicitly adverted to the high cost of discovery,

183. See Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 284 (2007) (“We also
note that Congress, in an effort to weed out unmeritorious securities lawsuits, has recently
tightened the procedural requirements that plaintiffs must satisfy when they file those suits.
To permit an antitrust lawsuit risks circumventing these requirements by permitting plaintiffs
to dress what is essentially a securities complaint in antitrust clothing.”).
184. See Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling
Private Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1, 23 n.88 (1995)
(noting that predatory pricing plaintiffs “must overcome deliberately underinclusive liability
rules”); Jean Wegman Burns, The Paradox of Antitrust and Lanham Act Standing, 42 UCLA
L. REV. 47, 95 (1994) (“Current antitrust standing rules eliminate not only clearly spurious
lawsuits; they also bar claims having potential merit and thereby permit some likely
violations to escape prosecution.”); Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L.
REV. 1159, 1210 (2008) (“Often, concerns about the chilling effect of the treble-damages
remedy and abusive private litigation influence the courts to implement underinclusive
liability norms in private suits.”); Lemos, supra note 60, at 833–34 (tracing limitation of
antitrust remedies to concern about incentives to sue created by treble damages provision);
Christopher R. Leslie, The Role of Consumers in Walker Process Litigation, 13 SW. J.L. &
TRADE AMERICAS 281, 301 (2007).
185. See, e.g., John B. McArthur & Thomas W. Paterson, The Effects of Monsanto,
Matsushita, and Sharp on the Plaintiff’s Incentive to Sue, 23 CONN. L. REV. 333, 334 (1991)
(“Much of the recent change in antitrust law has been built on the theoretical speculation of a
few economists, lawyers, and judges that the world is filled with plaintiffs who bring
frivolous antitrust lawsuits expecting to be handed a pot of gold by defendants terrified by
the threat of treble damages.”).
186. See Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J.
1527, 1549–50 (2011); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 551 U.S.
877, 900 (2007) (relying on adherents of Chicago School to justify overruling Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), and substituting rule of
reason for per se ban on vertical minimum-resale-price agreements); State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3, 15, 18 (1997) (abandoning per se ban on maximum resale price maintenance
agreements because “a considerable body of scholarship” suggested such agreements
advanced competition and provided “insufficient economic justification for per se
invalidation” of those agreements); Joshua D. Wright, Overshot the Mark? A Simple
Explanation of the Chicago School’s Influence on Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L
189, 194 (2009) (book review) (arguing that Chicago School’s most significant impact has
been on the per se rule of illegality).
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the risk of coerced settlements, and a perception of increasingly frivolous litigation
in antitrust.187
These examples of prisoners’ rights, securities litigation, and antitrust are not
exhaustive. RICO has been treated comparably to antitrust litigation by courts,
wary that the treble damages provision proves too much of an incentive for novel
and abusive litigation.188 Judges worry over the ability of plaintiffs to “exploit” the
damages and attorneys’ fees provisions of RICO.189 As one appellate court noted,
plaintiffs have attempted to put RICO to use in “novel––and often imaginative––
ways . . . in order to exploit RICO’s provisions for treble damages and attorney’s
fees.”190 And courts accordingly construe RICO’s liability provisions strictly,191
even as Congress instructed them to “liberally construe[]” the statute’s terms.192
Similarly, many commentators view judicial hostility to employment
discrimination litigation to reflect the perception that most such cases are weak or
frivolous.193 Relatedly, both judges and lawyers tend to agree that a fair proportion
of employment discrimination claims are unimportant or frivolous.194 Damages
caps, such as those present in employment discrimination, are often justified by the
perception of rampant frivolousness, but they tend to suppress litigation across the
board.195

187. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 895; Reeves & Stucke, supra note 186, at 1550.
188. See Lemos, supra note 60, at 835.
189. See G. Robert Blakey & Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO:
Reflections on Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective
Only Against White-Collar Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526, 580 (1987) (arguing that
the lower courts are “hostile to civil RICO” and that “[j]udicial efforts to narrow the scope of
the statute continue largely unabated”); David Kurzweil, Criminal and Civil RICO:
Traditional Canons of Statutory Interpretation and the Liberal Construction Clause, 30
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 41, 42, 45–46 (1996).
190. Doe v. Roe, 958 F.2d 763, 765 (7th Cir. 1992).
191. See Blakey & Cessar, supra note 189, at 580–90 & nn.230–39; Kurzweil, supra note
189, at 70–77, 86–88.
192. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904, 84 Stat. 922, 947.
193. See Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?,
61 LA. L. REV. 555, 561–69 (2001) (arguing that judges wrongly perceive employment
discrimination cases as meritless and that judicial hostility interferes with recovery for
meritorious claims); Lemos, supra note 60, at 830–31 (discussing judicial hostility to
employment discrimination cases as example of concern about prevalence of weak cases).
To some extent, this may reflect concern about docket load. See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner,
The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
71, 97–122 (1999) (arguing that courts have increased hostility to harassment cases brought
under Title VII, in part because of an increase in filing of Title VII claims after 1991).
194. See EIGHTH CIRCUIT GEND. FAIRNESS TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT &
RECOMMENDATIONS (1997), reprinted in 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 9, 72–73 (1997); see also
Lee Reeves, Pragmatism over Politics: Recent Trends in Lower Court Employment
Discrimination Jurisprudence, 73 MO. L. REV. 481, 508, 555–56 (2008) (offering data
suggesting that judges have negative perceptions of discrimination claims).
195. See Anita Bernstein, Complaints, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 37, 44 (2000) (discussing
reforms, such as caps on damages and arguing “that suppression of complaints is an
important motive for their enactment”).
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The examples used in this Subpart are disparate in many ways, but they reveal
many overlapping assumptions about the relationship between frivolous and
meritless litigation. First, there is a tendency to lump both categories of cases
together, be it for pre-answer screening, adjudications of motions to dismiss, or
substantive law. Second, when courts and legislators conflate the two kinds of
cases, it is often because of an assumption that both categories are equally
burdensome without offering any benefit. The goal of the rules discussed in this
Subpart is to winnow the field to enable courts to focus on only those cases with
actual merit. Third, most of the rules described in this Subpart—from the preanswer screening for claims by prisoners and poor persons to the general and
subject-matter-specific pleading rules—are founded on the view that a complaint
that fails to state a claim is meritless. The rules described here do not purport to
distinguish between claims that fail because of an insufficient legal theory and
those that fail because of inadequate factual allegation.
III. THE VALUE OF MERITLESS LITIGATION
I have offered a conception of meritless and frivolous litigation that
distinguishes between the two, and I have also shown how judges and legislators
often fail to make a similar distinction. The purpose of this Part is to show why we
should care about the conflation I outlined in Part II. I begin by providing a broad
framework for theorizing the value of meritless litigation, using some examples
that demonstrate this framework in action. I conclude with a discussion of how the
legal change discussed in Part II undermines the role that meritless litigation plays
in creating value. It should be said that I focus here on the value of meritless
litigation in an “internal” sense. That is, my goal is to articulate what meritless
litigation contributes to the law, not to institutions outside of or intertwined with
the law. For instance, it goes without saying that providing access to a judicial
system for all litigants ensures social stability by providing an alternative to violent
self-help. It might also enhance participation and faith in other social and political
institutions, or provide litigants with an avenue to tell their stories to an unbiased
listener. These are all important values, but they are not the focus of this Article.
A. The Framework for Appreciating the Value of Meritless Litigation
The value of meritless litigation can be conceptualized on many levels. First,
some meritless litigation will result in development or clarification of the law, even
if the plaintiff herself will not benefit. Civil rights litigation is the best example, but
any common law system will develop in part on the shoulders of unsuccessful
plaintiffs, leading to innovation and also providing stability. Take the development
of Eighth Amendment law. Perhaps the most significant case involving conditions
of confinement challenges by prisoners is Estelle v. Gamble,196 a case in which the
plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed by the Supreme Court. It reflects the value of
meritless litigation on two levels. First, Estelle announced a new legal standard for
the treatment of prisoners, which has defined the contours of prisoners’ rights

196. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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litigation for the last forty years.197 Second, in finding that the prisoner’s claim did
not meet that standard, Estelle marked the outer boundaries of the new
constitutional framework.198
This second aspect of Estelle may be more important than the first, because
courts can announce new standards governing conduct in both meritorious and
meritless cases. New standards bring with them uncertainty. But this instability is
offset when decisions apply the new standard in a particular factual context. The
value from concrete application is created in both meritorious and meritless cases.
Thus, Estelle is significant for the legal innovation it announced and for the
stability it created by cabining the reach of its new standard.
Sometimes, meritless cases are necessary to the development of a doctrine. Take
Wickard v. Filburn,199 the 1942 case that was a central figure in the dispute
surrounding the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act.200 In Wickard, Roscoe
Filburn sought to enjoin enforcement of a federal law that regulated wheat
production.201 To decide the case, the Court adopted an expansive view of
Congress’s Commerce Clause power that has dominated the landscape ever since.
Although the Court has recently shown some indications of limiting Wickard’s
reach,202 this only heightens the importance of Wickard to providing Congress with
predictable contours of the breadth of Commerce Clause power. And to the point of
this Article, Wickard was a meritless case—Filburn lost, but the legal system was
the beneficiary.
We can see a similar role for meritless litigation in the development of the law
of sex discrimination. Our modern understanding of the limitations imposed by the
Equal Protection Clause on sex classifications is informed by a series of cases that
began with Reed v. Reed and culminated in Craig v. Boren.203 By the end of this
series, one could make two observations about the constitutionality of sex

197. Id. at 103–04 (announcing “deliberate indifference” standard).
198. Id. at 105–07 (describing circumstances that failed to meet deliberate indifference
standard and applying them to the complaint).
199. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
200. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Adam Liptak, At
Heart of Health Law Clash, a 1942 Case of a Farmer’s Wheat, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2012,
at A1.
201. 317 U.S. at 114–15.
202. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995). But see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
203. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down statute that provided
different drinking ages for men and women); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975) (striking down Social Security Act provision that differentiated based on sex of
wage-earning spouse); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (upholding preferences
for women in Navy’s promotion system); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)
(upholding classification based on pregnancy in California’s disability insurance program);
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (upholding state property tax exemption for widows
but not widowers); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (striking down provision of
military benefits statute that disfavored spouses of women service members); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971) (rejecting sex classification in estate proceedings); see also Califano v.
Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (sustaining preference for women in calculation of social
security benefits).
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classifications: first, intentional sex classifications would be judged under
“intermediate scrutiny”; and second, the State would have more leeway to make
classifications based on “inherent” and not stereotyped differences.204 But one
would not be able to understand the meaning of these insights without both the
meritorious and meritless cases. As just one example, we know that one “inherent”
difference in gender that can form the basis of state regulation is past
discrimination against women in the workplace, just as we know that a difference
that cannot form the basis for regulation is a generalization about the bonds formed
by mothers and fathers with their children.205 We know the former because of an
unsuccessful challenge in Webster, and we know the latter because of a successful
challenge in Caban. As regards development of the law, however, both the
meritorious and meritless case has provided value.
The value of meritless litigation to legal development is not limited to public
law disputes. Tort and contract doctrine often have developed as a result of both
meritorious and meritless litigation. Courts have used meritless litigation to mark
the boundaries of duty of care in tort law, for example.206 Tort plaintiffs pursuing a
public nuisance theory in novel cases such as lead poisoning and gun violence have
charted a course guided by past failures, with varying degrees of success.207 This
has led scholars and practitioners to consider adopting a similar strategy to address
climate change.208 In contract law as well, legal development has been linked to
past failures. The doctrine of promissory estoppel, for example, developed in part

204. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–34 (1996) (summarizing sex
discrimination jurisprudence).
205. Compare Webster, 430 U.S. 313, with Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
206. In California, for instance, seven cases announced over a period of about sixty years
clarified a property owner’s duty of care to third parties. See King v. Lennen, 348 P.2d 98
(Cal. 1959) (finding liability); Garcia v. Soogian, 338 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1959) (rejecting
liability); Reynolds v. Willson, 331 P.2d 48 (Cal. 1958) (finding liability); Knight v. Kaiser
Co., 312 P.2d 1089 (Cal. 1957) (rejecting liability); Sanchez v. E. Contra Costa Irrigation
Co., 271 P. 1060 (Cal. 1928) (finding liability); Peters v. Bowman, 47 P. 113 (Cal. 1896)
(rejecting liability); Barrett v. S. Pac. Co., 27 P. 666 (Cal. 1891) (finding liability); see also
Allen E. Smith, Some Realism About a Grand Legal Realist: Leon Green, 56 TEX. L. REV.
479, 483 (1978) (“As we read cases we see that the history of tort law has been one of
changes in judicial rulings and language-use in response to the changing social and physical
environments.”).
207. Compare, e.g., Camden Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp.,
273 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2001) (rejecting public nuisance theory as applied to handgun
manufacturers), Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 920 (8th Cir.
1993) (rejecting nuisance theory pursued against asbestos manufacturers), and Detroit Bd. of
Educ. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d 513, 521 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (same), with Cnty. of
Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (accepting
public nuisance theory brought against lead paint manufacturers), and City of Bos. v. Smith
& Wesson Corp., No. 199902590, 2000 WL 1473568, at *14 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 13,
2000) (accepting public nuisance theory for handgun manufacturers); see also George L.
Priest, Market Share Liability in Personal Injury and Public Nuisance Litigation: An
Economic Analysis, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 109, 121–24 (2010) (criticizing use of public
nuisance theory).
208. See, e.g., David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based
Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 56–57 (2003).
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because some claims were rejected through rigid application of the consideration
requirement,209 and the doctrine of substantial performance emerged to ameliorate
the constructive conditions doctrine.210 One can trace numerous developments in
contract law through a common-law response to market conditions, changed social
dynamics, and perceived inadequacies of the status quo doctrine.211
Second, in addition to helping develop the law, some meritless litigation will
prompt more direct change in the law. The very fact that the litigation is
unsuccessful may be perceived as a problem to be fixed. The most recent example
of this is found in the legislative response to Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co.212 In Ledbetter, the Supreme Court rejected the employee’s Title VII pay
disparity case on statute of limitations grounds, holding that each paycheck
constituted a discriminatory act that must be subjected to Title VII exhaustion
within the period mandated by statute.213 The Court rested its decision in part on a
1977 decision, United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,214 offering that “[i]t would be
difficult [for Evans] to speak to the point more directly.”215 Thus, Ledbetter can
safely be classified as a meritless case. Yet it provoked significant legal change.
Within two years, Congress had passed and the President had signed the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, legislatively overruling the Court’s decision.216
The Civil Rights Act of 1991217 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act218 similarly
provide examples of a legislative response to court decisions rendering meritless
litigation that the political branches deem to have merit.219

209. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in Contracts, 36 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1379, 1405 (1995); Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil
Recourse Theory of Contractual Liability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 529, 574 (2011).
210. See Boone v. Eyre, (1777) 126 Eng. Rep. 160 (K.B.) (recognizing the need for
substantial performance four years after prior case establishing constructive conditions);
Glenn Walberg, Just Enough: Substantial Performance, Ministerial Acts and the All Events
Tests for Income and Expense Accruals, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 459, 469 (2010) (discussing
constructive conditions and substantial performance).
211. See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law During the
1980’s: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 203 (1990) (describing changes in contract
doctrine brought about by meritless and meritorious litigation); Jay M. Feinman, Relational
Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 737 (2000) (tracing developments in contract
law and theory); Vincent A. Wellman, Conceptions of the Common Law: Reflections on a
Theory of Contract, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 925, 958 (1987) (“If we conceive of the law of
contracts as fundamentally adaptive, then we should expect that an adequate theory of the
law of contracts must allow for change and should articulate the dimensions along which
change will likely occur.”).
212. 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
213. Id. at 624–26.
214. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
215. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 626.
216. See Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)).
217. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
218. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) (2006)).
219. The Civil Rights Act was a response to several decisions. See Equal Emp’t
Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (holding that Title VII
does not apply extraterritorially to United States employers); Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981 not to bar racial discrimination in
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One could run on with these examples. The Americans with Disabilities Act, for
instance, was in part a legislative response to the failure of federal and state courts
to provide adequate protection for individuals with disabilities.220 In other words,
the ADA stepped in to make meritorious what courts had previously deemed
meritless. Moreover, after the Supreme Court interpreted the ADA narrowly to
exclude many individuals from coverage,221 Congress responded once again with
amendments.222 The path to Brown v. Board of Education is littered with cases in
which courts adhered to Plessy v. Ferguson’s “separate but equal” doctrine.223 But
where the litigation strategy embraced education of the judiciary as the goal, even
with losses along the way, change has the potential to emerge.224 As Judge Robert
Carter has stated, “I have no doubt that the Supreme Court’s opportunity to
pronounce separate schools inherently unequal [in Brown v. Board of Education]
would have been delayed for a decade had my colleagues and I been required, upon
pain of potential sanctions, to plead our legal theory explicitly from the start.”225
Third, even if meritless litigation does not achieve formal legal change, it may
play an important role in a discussion of proper institutional conduct and behavior.
Lesley Wexler has recently argued that legal challenges to the Obama
Administration’s decision to target Anwar al-Aulaqi, although unsuccessful, have
the workplace); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (permitting white firefighters to bring
suit to challenge consent decree entered in litigation brought by black firefighters); Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (imposing stringent standard of proof for
plaintiff bringing disparate impact challenge); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989) (providing complete defense to employer in mixed-motive discrimination case). The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act legislatively overruled Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125 (1976) (exclusion by employer of pregnancy from disability coverage did not violate
Title VII), and Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
220. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 379 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (describing record before Congress of inadequate judicial response to
discrimination against the disabled).
221. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (adopting
narrow interpretation of “substantially” and “major”); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471 (1999) (adopting narrow interpretation of “disability”).
222. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (legislatively overruling Sutton
and Williams).
223. For various failed challenges to segregation, see, for example, Fisher v. Hurst, 333
U.S. 147 (1948) (per curiam); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (denial of Chinese
American student's admission into school for whites); Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45
(1908) (Kentucky statute mandating statewide school segregation); Cumming v. Richmond
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (closure of black high school); Carr v. Corning, 182
F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1950); cf. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Okla.
State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 639 (1950) (invalidating segregation in two public
schools as unequal under the circumstances, but without directly undermining the separatebut-equal doctrine); Thurgood Marshall, An Evaluation of Recent Efforts to Achieve Racial
Integration in Education Through Resort to the Courts, 21 J. NEGRO EDUC. 316, 318 (1952)
(“The greatest gains from this period was the public education of school officials, the courts
and the general public in the lawlessness of school officials . . . .”).
224. See Kenneth F. Ripple & Gary J. Saalman, Rule 11 in the Constitutional Case, 63
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 788, 811 (1988).
225. 151 CONG. REC. H9286 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 2005) (alteration in original).
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served several important purposes.226 Although failing on the immediate goals of
challenging the Administration’s decision, Wexler argues that the litigation
provoked a public debate about the limits of the war on terror, initiated scrutiny of
legal and policy decisions that the Administration has recently felt compelled to
respond to,227 and arguably created more transparency. Similarly, one might argue
that the ongoing litigation alleging that law schools falsified employment data, while
unlikely to succeed on the merits, has increased pressure on law schools and
regulatory bodies to provide better information to prospective applicants. And one
can look back to nineteenth-century litigators bringing uniformly unsuccessful
challenges regarding slavery and women’s suffrage to see the value of using
litigation to generate public debate and ultimately legal change.228
I have focused much of my discussion to this point on Supreme Court precedent,
which might strike some as misleading. Most meritless litigation does not reach the
Court’s doors, and cases selected by the Court for disposition are more likely to
resolve important and disputed legal principles. But meritless litigation plays much
the same role in lower court opinions as well. Thus, to the extent that lower courts
play a role in drawing the boundaries of constitutional doctrine, meritless litigation
can be extremely important.229 This is the case even for lower courts resolving issues
of common law tort liability230 and for cases involving statutory interpretation.231
Indeed, it might be argued that meritless cases are even more important for the
development and application of law in the lower courts than in the Supreme Court.
There are many more cases to resolve, and lower courts have more precedent to
adhere to, making the guidance offered by meritless cases particularly critical.
Meritless litigation can also produce stability. Outside of the legal system, if the
procedure for resolving disputes is perceived as fair and neutral, losers will be less
likely to resort to disruptive self-help.232 Within the legal system, meritless cases
mark the outer boundary of success. Parties who have to decide how to resolve
disputes—running the gamut from arbitration, to settlement, or trial—rely on both
meritorious and meritless cases to guide their decision making. In this sense,
meritless litigation is part of the stable foundation to our legal system.

226. See Lesley Wexler, Litigating the Long War on Terror: The Role of al-Aulaqi v.
Obama, 9 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 159 (2011).
227. See Charlie Savage, U.S. Law May Allow Killings, Holder Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,
2012, at A18.
228. See JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY 46–99 (2003).
229. See, e.g., Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2000) (synthesizing successful and
unsuccessful due process challenges to provide guidance to lower courts going forward).
230. See, e.g., Johnson v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334, 341 (1st Cir. 1980) (reviewing
successful and unsuccessful negligence claims to arrive at synthesis of duty of care owed to
longshoremen).
231. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (reviewing
prior case law to synthesize role of extrinsic evidence in claim construction in patents).
232. See Klein, Removing the Blindfold, supra note 113, at 608–10 (arguing that the cost of
easier Rule 12 dismissals under Iqbal is the undermining of faith in the neutrality of the judiciary).
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B. Barriers to Obtaining Value from Meritless Cases
Many theorists have recognized that litigation is about more than simply the
resolution of a dispute between two private parties. Abram Chayes introduced the
term “public law” to refer to litigation that is directed toward broad, systemic, and
transformative goals.233 Owen Fiss and Judith Resnik have found a similar role for
legal process in elaborating public values.234 Embracing this role of litigation
“assumes a procedural system hospitable to debate about the existence, scope, and
enforcement of public rights” and “rejects as unrealistically limited the traditional
model’s focus on private dispute resolution.”235 In other words, for litigation to play
this role we must have a procedural system that tolerates failure. If this increases
burdens on courts and even institutional defendants, it is worth the deterrence and
deliberative value.236 Even courts have at times recognized the nonadjudicative
value of litigation as a source of information that can prompt a discussion about
governmental action.237 As has been discussed, these values are not necessarily
limited to classic public law litigation.238
The focus on efficiency that characterizes judicial and legislative conflation of
meritless and frivolous litigation conflicts with this public law approach to
litigation. It fails to acknowledge the contributions that litigation can make to
empowering disfavored groups, encouraging deliberation about public values, and
enhancing justice in the court system.239 In a traditional focus on efficiency and

233. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1284, 1303–04 (1976).
234. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979) (“Adjudication is the social process by which judges give meaning
to our public values.”); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986); Yamamoto, supra note 106, at 398–99. Indeed, Fiss famously argued
that settlements should be disfavored because of the public values at stake. Owen M. Fiss,
Commentary, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Metaprocedure, 98 YALE L.J. 945, 957–59 (1989) (book review) (suggesting that critiques of
settlement may have more force where public rights are at stake).
235. Yamamoto, supra note 106, at 401; see also Chayes, supra note 233, at 1307–08.
236. Yamamoto, supra note 106, at 401.
237. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 431 (1978) (noting that a lawsuit can be a “vehicle for
effective political expression . . . as well as a means of communicating useful information to
the public”); Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 258 (7th Cir. 1975) (“[I]n our
present society many important social issues became entangled . . . in civil litigation. . . .
[C]ertain civil suits may be instigated for the very purpose of gaining information for the
public. . . . Civil litigation in general often exposes the need for governmental action or
correction.”).
238. See supra notes 206–11 and accompanying text; see also Miller, supra note 22, at
129 (arguing invocation of heightened pleading standard “fails to recognize the democratic
significance of litigation as a form of governance or oversight on bureaucratic activity, an
enforcement mechanism, and a channel for citizens to express their grievances against their
government or fellow citizens”).
239. See Yamamoto, supra note 106, at 403–21.
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cost reduction, “[t]he implicit message is that meritorious claims belong in the
system; those that appear likely to fail do not.”240
Even those who believe that the purpose of adjudication is limited to ensuring
that meritorious claims are adjudicated correctly have recognized the failings of
some of the changes discussed in Part II. Changes in pleading doctrine that
emphasize “plausibility” may prematurely (and incorrectly) categorize a
meritorious claim as meritless.241 Even if these changes do not result in inaccurate
filtering, they may deter the filing of meritorious claims.242 Changes in summary
judgment have prompted some of the same concerns.243 And some of the subject
matter specific changes, in the PSLRA and PLRA among others, have also been
criticized for failing to accurately filter out frivolous and meritless cases at the
correct procedural moment.244
Moreover, the judicial doctrine and legislative enactments that have been
influenced by a conflation of meritless with frivolous litigation have a significant
impact on the role that meritless litigation can play in the legal universe. Some of
the connections are obvious. To the extent that Congress has equated frivolous and
meritless litigation in the PLRA’s three-strikes and exhaustion provisions, it
directly interferes with the filing of all categories of cases. But most of the
developments discussed in Part II have a less direct connection to the problem
described in this Article. In part this is because many of the legal rules adopted by
courts and legislatures affect the timing at which cases are adjudicated. Most of the
doctrine and statutory enactments introduced as a result of the conflation between
frivolous and meritless emphasizes final disposition as early as possible in a civil
case’s life span. But the earlier that a meritless case is dismissed, the less likely that
it will create value for the legal system because early dismissals will tend to be less
informed decisions to dismiss.
Additionally, to the extent that judicial and legislative responses have made it
difficult to proceed with meritless litigation past the motion to dismiss stage, it

240. Id. at 402; see also Bone, supra note 24, at 882–83 (noting that allowing cases to
proceed on the theory that discovery may reveal useful information is insufficient because
the investigation that occurs in discovery is not the “purpose of adjudication”).
241. See Bone, supra note 24, at 878–79 (describing problem with Iqbal standard as
screening out meritorious cases, “even ones with a high probability of trial success but a
probability that is not evident at the pleading stage before access to discovery”); Miller,
supra note 22, at 28 (“Iqbal may eliminate a range of arguably weak but potentially
meritorious cases, not merely meritless actions.”); Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of
Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119 (2011) (presenting data suggesting that Iqbal and
Twombly will be poor filters for merit); Spencer, supra note 24, at 432, 481 (criticizing
Twombly for permitting dismissal prior to discovery, which might show whether a particular
claim is meritorious or “frivolous or nonmeritorious”).
242. See Miller, supra note 22, at 71–77 (discussing concern that Iqbal and Twombly will
deter filing or enforcement of meritorious public law claims, which have an important
regulatory and deterrent effect).
243. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 75 (1990) (“[L]iberalized summary judgment inhibits the filing
of otherwise meritorious suits and results in a wealth transfer from plaintiffs as a class to
defendants as a class.”).
244. See Choi, supra note 167, at 602.
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prevents litigants from engaging in the kind of factual discovery that can prompt
future changes in legal rules.245 Moreover, as cases are dismissed at earlier and
earlier procedural stages, the announcement of relevant legal rules inevitably will
be more generalized and less tailored to specific factual scenarios, thus depriving
future litigants of meaningful guidance. And, of course, to the extent that litigants
are subjected to the same sanctions for both frivolous and meritless litigation, it
heightens the perception that nothing is to be gained by either.
To make some of these concerns more concrete, I will use the Court’s decision
in Iqbal as an example, but the problems I identify are equally applicable to any
heightened pleading regime.246 Recall that in Iqbal, the first principle offered by
the Court was that “conclusory” factual allegations should be discarded at the
motion to dismiss stage. In Iqbal, this meant that the Court could disregard the
allegation that the defendants intentionally treated the plaintiff differently on
account of his race, religion, and national origin. Had the Court credited those
allegations, it would have had to confront the difficult question posed by Iqbal:
namely, whether the circumstances of September 11 and its aftermath would
justify the differential treatment challenged in that case. Instead, by construing
the complaint absent those critical allegations, the Court failed to resolve an
important constitutional question that could guide officials, litigants, and courts
in the future.

245. For instance, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was enacted after the Supreme
Court found that Title VII did not protect against discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.
See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)), superseding Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The
trial court in Gilbert had found, after hearing testimony and reviewing extensive discovery,
that General Electric’s policies constituted discrimination on the basis of sex. See Gilbert v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974). More recently, the multistate litigation
effort against law schools for their allegedly deceptive marketing practices has not resulted
in any tangible relief for the plaintiffs, but some of the facts learned as a result of that
litigation have prompted calls for regulatory bodies to adopt important changes to how law
schools collect and disclose information. See Ben Trachtenberg, Law School Marketing and
Legal Ethics, 91 NEB. L. REV. 866, 912–23 (2013) (noting that lawsuits against law schools
have not yet proven successful but proposing regulatory changes in response to disclosures
about law school marketing practices). And there has been some limited progress in
response. See ABA House of Delegates, Resolution 103 (Aug. 6–7, 2012),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_delegates/resolutions
/2012_hod_annual_meeting_103.doc (adopting amendments to Standard 509 and Rule 16 of
the ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools); Martha Neil, ABA
Looking for Ways to Better Monitor Employment Stats for Law Graduates, A.B.A. J. (Feb.
22, 2013, 3:03 PM CST), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba_to_mull_audit
_procedures_for_employment_data_re_new_law_graduates
(“[T]he
American
Bar
Association is seeking bids for what the National Law Journal calls a law school data cop.”);
Debra Cassens Weiss, No Fudging: Revised Standard Bars Law Schools from Publishing
Misleading Consumer Info, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 6, 2012, 10:46 AM CST),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/no_fudging_revised_standard_bars_law_schools
_from_publishing_misleadin/ (reporting that ABA House of Delegates voted to require
greater disclosure to consumers).
246. See Bone supra note 45, at 918 n.190.
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As a second example, take the Court’s plausibility analysis, which calls upon
courts to use their “judicial experience and common sense” to determine the
sufficiency of a complaint. By liberating courts to dismiss complaints on these
grounds, Iqbal may function to make 12(b)(6) dismissals sui generis, thereby
depriving courts and litigants of the predictability and stability that meritless
litigation has provided in the past.
The qualified immunity doctrine functions in a different way to prevent
meritless litigation from providing value. First, qualified immunity plays a large
role in case selection. If plaintiffs’ lawyers are risk averse,247 they will choose cases
in which qualified immunity plays a limited role in case resolution.248 The result
may be that the vast majority of constitutional damages cases never test the limits
of existing law, because the attorneys who file them select cases that are within the
“clearly established” zone that will defeat a qualified immunity defense.249
Second, as suggested in Part II, the order by which courts resolve the
questions presented by the qualified immunity defense also will affect the extent
to which meritless litigation can shape the law. If courts dismiss cases because
the law was not clearly established at the time of an alleged violation,
constitutional law will remain static. John Jeffries has argued that qualified
immunity permits courts to engage in legal innovation,250 but this proposition will
not hold if cases are routinely dismissed after courts only answer the clearly
established law question.251
CONCLUSION
It is somewhat surprising that courts and academics overlook the value of
litigant failure. After all, judges routinely issue dissents in cases, presumably
because they believe there is some benefit to articulating their own rejected
position. Dissents have been said to act as a counterweight to the majority opinion,
“keeping the majority accountable for the rationale and consequences of its
decision” and providing guidance to future courts and litigants about how to limit

247. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the
Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 230–32 (1983);
Robert H. Lande, New Options for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting the Real
Victims of Antitrust Violations, 61 ALA. L. REV. 447, 453 (2010); Patrick A. Luff, Bad
Bargains: The Mistake of Allowing Cost-Benefit Analyses in Class Action Certification
Decisions, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 65, 80 n.59 (2010).
248. See Alexander A. Reinert, Does Qualified Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L. J.
477 (2011) (reporting on results of qualitative survey suggesting that pre-filing screening by
attorneys filters out claims that might be subject to a qualified immunity defense).
249. Qualified immunity may have this impact not simply because of its substantive
content, but also due to the procedural obstacles that accompany invocation of the qualified
immunity defense. Dealing with client expectations while a case is on interlocutory appeal
and not progressing through discovery may be a deterrent to bringing particular lawsuits—
even when the plaintiff’s attorney thinks that the qualified immunity defense will ultimately
be rejected.
250. See Jeffries, supra note 30, at 90.
251. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
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the reach of the majority opinion.252 And some, of course, chart the course for an
eventual change in the law.253
Meritless litigation does not rise to the level of a dissent, but it may serve similar
values. Like dissents, meritless litigation can mark the boundaries of established
law, prompt legal change, or provoke a broader discussion of legal norms. But
meritless litigation is undervalued by judges and legislators, leading to significant
developments in statutory enactments and judicial doctrine.
It is worth taking a moment to consider what it might mean to better recognize
the distinction between frivolous and meritless litigation. Some answers are
obvious: the PLRA’s three-strikes provision and prescreening provision should be
revised to eliminate the conflation of frivolous and meritless suits; pleading
doctrine should be focused on traditional measures of legal insufficiency and not
the factual inquiry that Iqbal and Twombly may suggest.
Other answers may be more controversial. Incentivizing all meritless litigation
might not be justified, because although it provides value it also incurs costs. But
the specific category of meritless litigation created by qualified immunity may
justify closer consideration. For instance, if attorneys’ fees were available for
plaintiffs who showed that their rights were violated, even though the rights were
not clearly established, it might incentivize attorneys to represent litigants in the
“gray” area of constitutional litigation. This model is not foreign to civil rights
litigation—in mixed-motive employment discrimination cases, plaintiffs who
prevail are not entitled to compensatory damages but may be awarded other relief,
including attorneys’ fees.254 And the Supreme Court has recognized that attorneys’
fees in civil rights litigation may far exceed a plaintiff’s compensatory award
because it is important to encourage the vindication of constitutional rights even
when doing so is economically inefficient.255 By the same token, it would be unfair
to ask a defendant to bear the costs of a plaintiff’s unsuccessful litigation; it may be
necessary to create court-operated funds to provide such incentives.
Notably, Congress has recognized the need to incentivize meritless litigation in
patent disputes. The Hatch-Waxman Act encourages generic drug manufacturers to
challenge the validity of existing pharmaceutical patents, on the theory that it will
result in speedier production of cheaper generic versions of brand-name
pharmaceuticals. Through what is known as a “Paragraph IV” filing, the first

252. See William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 430 (1986);
see also Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr., Appellate Dissent: A Worthwhile Endeavor or an
Exercise in Futility?, 47 HOW. L.J. 383, 388 (2004) (“The most important function of a dissent,
in my view, is to expose the perceived error or weaknesses in the logic that the majority has
chosen to employ in its decision.”); Randall T. Shepard, What Can Dissents Teach Us?, 68
ALB. L. REV. 337, 338–39 (2005) (“The generous view portrays the dissent as fulfilling a vital
role in clarifying the law by enhancing the quality of majority opinions, stimulating the
intellectual exchange among judges and, ultimately, serving as a ‘safeguard of democracy.’”).
For a discussion of the canonization of certain dissents and dissenters, see Anita S.
Krishnakumar, On the Evolution of the Canonical Dissent, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 781 (2000).
253. Brennan, supra note 252, at 430; Hassell, supra note 252, at 391; Shepard, supra
note 252, at 342–44.
254. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006).
255. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (rejecting proportionality test
for fee awards under § 1988).
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generic drug manufacturer who brings such a challenge is entitled to a 180-day
exclusivity period wherein the challenging manufacturer has the sole right to
market the generic version of the drug.256 The challenger is the beneficiary of the
180-day exclusivity period even if there is no merit to its claim of patent invalidity.
As one commentator has noted, the Paragraph IV filing “changes the ordinary risk
calculus for patent litigation”—the challenger need not worry over being sued for
damages for patent infringement, but stands to gain significantly from being the
first to file a challenge.257 At the same time, Congress believed that encouraging
such suits would spark innovation among brand-name manufacturers who will
create new drugs at a faster pace.258
Even if incentivizing meritless litigation is not in the cards outside of
pharmaceutical production, it remains essential that courts and legislators take
greater care in translating assumptions about the relative value of frivolous and
meritless litigation into doctrine and statutes. Recognizing the value of meritless
litigation will not always translate into adopting procedural rules that permit such
litigation to proceed to discovery and trial. As I have shown in this paper, how we
adjudicate cases can be as important as when we adjudicate them. Even if, for
instance, courts continue to dismiss many meritless cases at the pleading stage,
courts may leverage whatever value such cases have by adjusting how they resolve

256. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006). The benefit of the 180-day exclusivity
period is the ability to charge near-monopoly prices. See Donna M. Gitter, Innovators and
Imitators: An Analysis of Proposed Legislation Implementing an Abbreviated Approval
Pathway for Follow-On Biologics in the United States, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 555, 573
(2008) (noting that during the 180-day period the generic drug “shares duopoly prices with
the Brand-name drug” (quoting Steven W. Day, Note, Leaving Room for Innovation:
Rejecting the FTC’s Stance Against Reverse Payments in Schering-Plough v. FTC, 57 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 223, 229–30 (2006))).
257. See David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment
Settlements in Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1303, 1306–07 (2010).
Between 1992 and 2000, 72% of Paragraph IV challenges have resulted in litigation with the
challenger prevailing 42% of the time. Shankar Nai, The Effect of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act on Patent Law and Policy, 10 LOY. L. & TECH. ANN. 62, 75 (2012)
(citing Federal Trade Commission study).
258. See Bryan A. Liang, Regulating Follow-On Biologics, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363,
365 (2007) (arguing that the Hatch-Waxman Act has been very successful in bringing
cheaper generic versions of drugs to the market while maintaining incentives for continued
innovation); Allen M. Sokal & Bart A. Gerstenblith, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Encouraging
Innovation and Generic Drug Competition, 10 CURRENT TOPICS MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY
1950 (2010). But see Gitter, supra note 256, at 611–12 (describing Congress’s intent but
questioning efficacy of Hatch-Waxman Act); Nai, supra note 257, at 74–75 (questioning
innovation claim). An analogous example can be found in agency rulemaking. During the
late 1970s the Federal Trade Commission experimented with a regime in which the agency
funded public participation in agency rulemaking proceedings, on the theory that greater
involvement by otherwise underrepresented groups would lead to better agency decision
making. See Barry B. Boyer, Funding Public Participation in Agency Proceedings: The
Federal Trade Commission Experience, 70 GEO. L.J. 51 (1981) (assessing effectiveness of
program). The effectiveness of the program is difficult to evaluate, but it did alter somewhat
the makeup of the individuals who provided testimony to the FTC as well as the scope of
questioning that was undertaken by counsel during hearings. Id. at 116–17, 128–29.
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them. Providing more specificity in judgments at the motion to dismiss stage will
provide more clarity and guidance in the law as we move forward. Similarly,
changing how we resolve claims of qualified immunity can benefit our legal system
even if it does not change the outcome of cases in which the defense is raised.
Refusing to acknowledge the distinct value of meritless litigation, by contrast,
measures litigation solely by the outcome it achieves for the parties to the dispute—
litigation that does not change the status quo is a failure on this account. If we
expect our legal system to continue to evolve and adapt, however, this kind of
failure must be tolerated, even if not embraced.

